

***FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY
NOT FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION***

Mid-Term Evaluation

Of the

**Management of Indigenous Vegetation
for the Rehabilitation of Degraded Rangelands
in the Arid Zone of Africa Project**

**GEF Project Number GF/2740-03-4618
GF/1030-03-71**

Final Report

Prepared by:

**Roy Hagen
Evaluation Team Leader**

and

**Cliff Studman
Principal Evaluator for the Research Component**

**And incorporating inputs from National Consultants:
Inyatseng Mandevu, Botswana
Souleymane Kouyabe, Mali
and Evans Mwangi, Kenya**

December 18, 2005

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	3
Introduction	5
Background	5
Scope, Purpose and Methodology	5
Evaluation of the project Design	7
Seriously flawed design	7
Confusion on the Role of Research in the Project Design	10
Necessary conditions for community-based management	11
Corrective Measures to Address Design Weaknesses	12
Findings on Project Implementation	14
Progress towards achievement of the Project Objective	14
Findings Botswana	14
Findings Mali	18
Findings Kenya	21
Research Findings	25
Main General Findings - Research	25
Findings Categorized under Research Outcomes	27
The scientific leadership provided by the University of Oslo	33
Conclusions, Ratings and Lessons Learned	34
Conclusions and Ratings	34
Lessons Learned	39
Recommendations	41
Strategic Restructuring of the Project	41
Country-Specific Recommendations	43
Country Specific Recommendations: Botswana	43
Country Specific Recommendations: Mali	44
Country Specific Recommendations: Kenya	46
Recommendations: Research	47
Other Recommendations	49
Appendices	50
Appendix A: Suggested Criteria for the Selection of Pilot Communities	50
Appendix B: Suggested Criteria for Site-Based Targeted Research	50
Appendix C: Research Issues listed in Project Document	51
Appendix D: Research Plan Revision requirements	53
Appendix E: Co-financing and Leveraged Resources	53

Executive Summary

The Management of Indigenous Vegetation for the Rehabilitation of Degraded Rangelands in the Arid Zone of Africa Project (more commonly called the Indigenous Vegetation Project or simply IVP) was conceived and developed to address one of the greatest environmental problems of the arid and semi-arid drylands of Africa – that of land degradation. Drylands cover roughly 60% of Africa. Most of these drylands are moderately to severely degraded.¹ The main causes of land degradation on Africa's drylands include overgrazing and unsustainable use of range products. IVP was designed to develop sustainable systems of range/vegetation management. IVP was to place a major emphasis on the integration indigenous knowledge into new community-based range management systems and research was to play a key part in this.

The design of the project is seriously flawed. The Project Objective is hidden in an annex, key terms are undefined and the strategic linkages between the six project outcomes and the Project Objective are very weak. False assumptions were made and risks were badly underestimated. Flaws in the design have contributed strongly to the confusion and lack of focus in the implementation of the project that have continued until the time of the Mid-Term Review (MTR). Efforts made during project execution to identify and to correct the design flaws have been only partially successful.

Overall progress towards achievement of the project objective in all three countries is very modest and is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. In the field, the project often appears as primarily a rural development project sponsoring a multitude of alternative livelihood “micro-projects”. However, the project enjoys good levels of participation of local communities and there is clear evidence that communities wish to control and to manage their resources.

Regarding the research components, the development of the Masters' degree program is Satisfactory, but site-specific targeted research has not even begun. The type(s) of indigenous vegetation management “model(s)” to be developed remain undefined.

If the project were to continue on the same course that it was on at the time of the MTR, it would almost certainly not achieve its objective. Based on the findings and the rankings of progress made and performance, it would be quite easy to recommend that the project be simply shut down. The MTR considered this option, but decided against it for several reasons. The IVP country teams have developed positive working relationships with local communities on their field sites. They enjoy generally good support from local authorities and are well integrated with government technical services. Communities in Botswana have a clear and strong desire to control and to manage their resources. Communities in Kenya have requested the help of IVP to reinvigorate the traditional range management systems that they have come close to losing and are open to building upon and to going beyond the traditional systems. Communities in Mali have shown an exceptional capacity for mobilization for collective action when they see it to be for the common good of the community.

The MTR recommends that IVP undertake a drastic restructuring and that IVP be strongly refocused on the core Project Objective and on those interventions that are truly essential for achieving the project objective. As to the feasibility of doing this, the MTR draws inspiration from the Senegal/Mauritania Biodiversity Project -- a similar community-based range and

¹ TerreAfrica

vegetation management project that was dramatically restructured and refocused on to its original objective within a three month period of time.

MTR recommends that each country should set the objective of having a minimum of two functioning community-based range/vegetation management systems by the end of the project. These management systems should be run by representative community management institutional structures of an appropriate legal status. Each community management structure should have been empowered by appropriate government authorities to control access and to manage their rangelands. Each pilot community should have a functioning adaptive range/vegetation management system by the end of the project.

Detailed Highest Level Priority Recommendations of the MTR are the following:

1. IVP should have a minimum of two functional community-based range/vegetation management (CBRM) systems in each country by the End of Project (EOP)
2. Each functional CBRM system in each country should be based on:
 - A representative, legally registered, community management institution
 - Agreed access rights to the lands/resources managed by each community structure;
 - A document conferring management rights and obligations to the pilot management structure (In the absence of an adequate legal framework, this may have to be done as a special exemption for the specific IVP pilot communities).
3. The main focus of research should be on nationally driven, site-based, short-term research in support of CBRM with research results transferred to communities and IVP field teams; the role of the University of Oslo should be to act in an advisory capacity, making timely suggestions and advice to the researchers.
4. Sound ecological monitoring systems should be put in place at each pilot site with institutional arrangements to ensure their continuation over the mid to long term;
5. IVP should seek to mainstream CBRM into government programs/policies/laws and into community/government/private sector/civil society partnerships. This should be based on BD2 guidelines and indicators.

Introduction

Background

1. The Management of Indigenous Vegetation for the Rehabilitation of Degraded Rangelands in the Arid Zone of Africa Project (more commonly called the Indigenous Vegetation Project or simply IVP) was conceived and developed to address one of the greatest environmental problems of the arid and semi-arid drylands of Africa – that of land degradation. Drylands cover roughly 60% of Africa. Most of these drylands are moderately to severely degraded.² The main causes of land degradation on Africa's drylands are overgrazing, unsustainable use of range products and, in semi-arid areas, conversion to rainfed agriculture (much of which is itself unsustainable). The Indigenous Vegetation Project was developed between 1998 and 2000. Countries and sites deemed to be representative of conditions in Africa's drylands in southern, western and eastern Africa were selected. IVP was to develop community-based indigenous vegetation management systems building strongly on indigenous knowledge. Biodiversity conservation and rehabilitation of degraded rangelands were to be the results of the development of these new management systems. There was to be a strong comparative research and comparative learning component to IVP cutting across the three countries/regions.

Scope, Purpose and Methodology

2. **Purpose:** This is a Mid-Term Review (MTR) or evaluation of IVP. As is typical of a MTR, the purpose is to evaluate progress made towards the achievement of the project objective, to identify problems and constraints encountered and to make recommendations for modifications as needed to better achieve the Project Objective in the time remaining.
3. **Scope:** One of the constraints typically encountered in a project evaluation is the project design itself. The TOR for this evaluation includes an evaluation of the project design. The project design document that was approved by GEF is called the Brief. UNEP and UNDP are each implementing separate portions of the IVP project. Each has replaced the cover pages to the Brief with their own cover pages, but the basic design and the text of the document remains unchanged. UNDP and UNEP each call their project document the ProDoc. ProDoc is the term that is used for this MTR rather than Brief, because ProDoc is more widely understood.
4. The TOR for this evaluation are very comprehensive and inclusive. Nearly all aspects of the project are covered. The MTR team has attempted to address all points in the TOR. However, they have also used their own judgment to determine the relative importance assigned to different sections of the TOR.
5. **Methodology** The basic reference point of this evaluation is the Project Objective. Both the design and the implementation of the project are evaluated in respect to the Project Objective. The PO of IVP is the following:

² TerreAfrica

To develop models for the conservation of biodiversity and rehabilitation of degraded rangelands, and to develop sustainable management systems using indigenous knowledge.

6. This is clearly a field-based project. The management systems can only be developed in the field working with pilot communities. This evaluation has focused primarily on what the project is doing in the field.
7. The MTR Team was recruited specifically to meet the special conditions and needs of the IVP project. For team leader, an individual with very broad experience in biodiversity conservation, sustainable resource management, community-based approaches and with experience in GEF project design and evaluation was selected. Individual national consultants were recruited by the UNDP Country Office in each country to provide context and insights that are often impossible for an international consultant to master during a short visit. The national consultants were also required to visit the IVP field sites that the Team Leader was unable to visit (Mali was the exception where the national consultant had to be changed at the last minute and the person selected had other commitments that prevented him from visiting the Bamba site). Finally a second international consultant was recruited specifically to evaluate the research component of the project. This was done because the research component of IVP has been the most problematic of the different project components and nearly all project partners were dissatisfied with progress in this area. An individual with experience as director of research for a university was selected to evaluate the research component of IVP.
8. The MTR Team Leader visited all three IVP countries for one week each including at least three days in the field in each country. The MTR research evaluator also visited each country for a shorter period of time and visited the University of Oslo and Norwegian University in Oslo. The MTR Team Leader began his mission in Nairobi with meetings with UNEP, UNDP and UNOPS. A set of guidelines for the national consultants was prepared by the Team Leader and was sent out to the three national consultants near the beginning of the exercise.
9. In any project as large and complex as IVP with the volume of documentation that has been generated by IVP, it is impossible to read all the documentation or to meet with all the actors. Inevitably, the evaluators must use their judgment and experience to set priorities and on the use of their time. One of the main judgement calls made on the MTR for IVP is the emphasis that has been placed on the empowerment of community management structures that must take place before community-based management systems can be developed. This and other important “pre-conditions” for community-based management are scarcely mentioned in the ProDoc and have not been given the attention they deserve during implementation.
10. Otherwise, the methodology of the evaluation was fairly conventional. It consisted of a very close analysis of the ProDoc, review of key documents and intensive interviews with as many of the key actors as was possible during the time allotted. Key questions would be noted before each meeting. The Team leader would seek to compare impressions with the national consultant or with the research evaluator soon after each meeting. At the end of each country visit, the Team Leader would review findings and discuss recommendations with the national consultant. One or two briefings of preliminary finding and preliminary recommendation were made in each country. A much more complete presentation of findings and recommendations was made the IVP Regional Policy Steering Committee on 28 September 2006. Feedback has been incorporated into this draft. Reports prepared by the national

consultants were forwarded to the Team Leader who integrated their findings into the first full draft. The first full draft evaluation was completed by the Team Leader and the research evaluator by October 18 and was circulated to all RPSC members for comment. Comments have been reviewed and further changes have been incorporated in this final draft.

Evaluation of the project Design

Seriously flawed design

11. The design of the project is seriously flawed. The Project Objective is hidden in an annex, key terms are undefined and the strategic linkages between the six outcomes and the Project Objective is very weak. Flaws in the design have contributed substantially to the lack of focus in the implementation of the project, especially in Mali and Kenya.
12. **The Project Title** is “The Management of Indigenous Vegetation for the Rehabilitation of Degraded Rangelands in the Arid Zone of Africa”. The title presents a very strong depiction of what the project is about, except for the use of the term “Indigenous Vegetation”. This term has little meaning to many people. The UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in Mali learned from the MTR Team what the project is about – for the first time. He said the confusing title is “typical for GEF projects”. Even though the local consultant for the MTR in Botswana was the number two person in the Ministry of Agriculture and Crop Production when IVP started (IVP was attached to this Ministry at the time of the evaluation), he admitted that it was only during the MTR that he learned what the project is about. From the title, he had imagined something completely different.
13. **Formulation of the Project Objective:** As stated in the Introduction, this evaluation has primarily focused on progress made towards the achievement of the project objective. We noted that the Project Objective cannot be found in Section 3 of the GEF Brief titled “Rationale and Objectives”. It can be only found in the logframe in Appendix II:

To develop models for the conservation of biodiversity and rehabilitation of degraded rangelands, and to develop sustainable management systems using indigenous knowledge.

14. The following weaknesses in this formulation are noted:
 - The word model can have very different meanings in different contexts -- it is never defined in the ProDoc (and remains undefined at the time of the MTR)
 - This formulation gives the impression that the development of models for biodiversity conservation and rehabilitation is a different objective from that of the developing sustainable management systems. This also remains unclear at the time of the MTR;
 - Nothing is said about who should manage or what should be managed – although the Project title makes it clear “what” is to be managed, one has to “read the fine print” of the Prodoc to discover that the project will develop community-based management systems. This can be found in the “Justification for GEF financing” and in the results section of the Logframe (1.1).
15. **Pertinence of the Project Objective** The Evaluation Team feels that the Project Objective remains, highly pertinent. Over 60% of Africa is composed of drylands. Most of these drylands are moderately to severely degraded. Overgrazing and unsustainable use are key

causes of this degradation. This is resulting in widespread negative environmental and socio-economic impacts. IVP was designed to address this problem -- through the development and testing of innovative, community-based range management systems. Although the details of the design are flawed, the objective remains enormously important.

16. **Coherence of the logframe** In the logical framework of a project, the project objective is to be achieved through the realization of two or more outcomes. Each outcome is strategically linked to the project objective and is necessary for meeting the objective. Section Four of the IVP Prodoc presents the following six Outcomes (also called Components).
 - O-1 Establishment and strengthening of appropriate indigenous management systems;
 - O-2 Establishment of a regional arid zone database
 - O-3 Rehabilitation of indigenous vegetation and degraded lands
 - O-4 Improved livestock production and marketing and provision of alternative livelihoods;
 - O-5 Technology transfer, training and regional comparative learning
 - O-6 Targeted research
17. **Lack of strategic linkages** Section Four speaks of the linkages between the six Outcomes across the three countries but does not present their strategic linkage to the Project Objective. This, combined with the fact that the Project Objective is hidden away in an annex, is almost certainly the greatest weakness of project design. Country teams tasked with implementing the project, set about working on the six outcomes without any clear overall vision of how all the pieces were supposed to fit together. And this fragmented vision and approach still existed at the time of the MTR. As two examples, research is being developed and rural development alternative livelihood activities are being developed without a clear framework defining how each contributes towards achievement of the project objective.
18. **Other key logframe weaknesses**
 - The first outcome is nearly identical to the Project Objective. Achieving O-1 would be largely the same as achieving the objective – making the other outcomes superfluous. But in a good logframe, each outcome is necessary for achievement of the project objective.
 - O-1 and O-3 should be combined. Rangeland rehabilitation is logically the result of a sound management system. Listing it as a separate outcome has led country teams to treat the symptoms of land degradation in small, fenced perimeters.
 - The justification, objective and the linkages of the regional database in O-2 with the project objective are weak – and remained largely undefined at the time of the MTR. It is also not clear (and remained so at the time of the MTR) if the database was intended to be a key part of targeted research – O-6.
 - The justification, objective and the linkages of the improved livestock production and marketing and provision for alternative livelihoods of O-4 is not clear – and remained so at the time of the MTR.
 - Although the Prodoc is peppered with reference to research, the justification and objectives of this research and the ways in which the research were to be used in O-6 remain unclear – and remained so at MTR. The term “targeted research” has never been defined and is a source of confusion. :
19. **Little sense of realism** There is no sense of recognition in the Prodoc of the enormity of the challenge of developing viable range management systems. Africa has known decades of failed range management projects. In the 60s, 70s and 80s, donors spent hundreds of millions of dollars in universally failed attempts to develop range or ranch management systems (the

approaches at that time were almost universally “top-down” and were based on an outdated paradigm ecological equilibrium that has since been largely rejected). Results were so universally negative, by the late 80s and 90s, there were few donors left who would invest in the sector. Yet in the analysis of risk section, one finds the incredible statement that, “The Project does not face any major risk”. The Evaluation Team Leader considers the development of range management systems of communal lands to be one of the most difficult challenges of all in the natural resource management arena.

20. **Lack of focus** The design is very poorly focused – one gets the sense that it tries to be all things to all people. There is no clear focus to the research and the regional database. Improved livestock production and marketing could easily each be developed as separate projects, each requiring specialized expertise different from that needed to develop community-based range management systems. Improved livelihoods can lead one into an open-ended spectrum of rural development activities, each with demanding their own types of expertise and many of them very demanding in financial resources. Technology transfer for energy saving technologies again require specialized expertise. The project tries to do a little bit of everything – a sort of “shotgun approach”. Experience across Africa has shown time and time again that projects that attempt to do a little bit of everything usually end up by not doing any one thing well – and therefore having little lasting impact. It is especially important for a project like IVP that sets itself an extremely difficult project objective, to focus its energies on that objective and to ensure that all outcomes, outputs and activities are strategically linked to the project objective.
21. **Danger of perverse effects** Most pastoralists take pride in having large herds and maintain large herds as a strategy for better surviving catastrophes like droughts or epidemics. With increased incomes, pastoralists commonly invest in more livestock. One should not be surprised if development of alternative livelihoods, in the absence of effective range management systems, to lead to increased land degradation and loss of biodiversity. The project includes alternative livelihoods without any criteria for strategically linking this with the Project Objective. This is quite simplistic.
22. **Project length** Most experienced natural resource professionals would favor a 10-20 year approach for the development of new management systems. Only a very few donors take such a perspective. A five-year project length should be considered a bare minimum for development of a new functional NR management models/systems. For the extremely difficult challenge of range management on communal lands, a longer period would be highly desirable. Part of the reason is the highly variable rainfall in African rangelands. Management systems must necessarily take a strong “adaptive management” approach. Putting a functioning community management structure in place and initiating the development of management systems can easily take three years. Then a project should work with the community managers for at least 3 or 4 years to hopefully accompany them through both wet and dry years. The five-year length of IVP is a design constraint.
23. **Invalid assumption** The pilot sites were chosen during project development. The Prodoc states that the criteria for site selection includes the “presence of viable, indigenous management structures...” The Prodoc also states, “A key factor... ability to use indigenous institutions in order to maintain.. full resource access rights” In Kenya, one finds fragments of the former indigenous management structures. Clans continue to maintain some level of control of access to their traditional lands but there is little left for functioning management systems. The traditional council of elders (literal translation for this group in Turkana is “tree of man”) when supported by government appointed “chiefs” can sometimes (even without the

project) muster the authority to undertake rainy season deferred grazing to regenerate degraded lands. But in Botswana and Mali, the MTR found no evidence of indigenous management structures. Indeed, all of the Botswana sites and the Nara site in Mali seem to be very close to complete open access grazing. The Nara site is still characterized by the traditional transhumance on a very large scale. But there is no management authority and no control of access. Furthermore, it is not clear that there ever were traditional management systems there that had specific measures to ensure the continued productivity of rangelands and/or to regenerate degraded rangelands.

24. **Weak root cause analysis** The analysis in the ProDoc is very poorly done. A well done root-cause analysis is an invaluable tool for identifying and addressing the key root causes of the main threats that result in land degradation and biodiversity loss and for identifying the management barriers to sustainable land management for effective biodiversity conservation.
25. Recommendations to correct these design weaknesses are given in the last chapter -- on recommendations.

Confusion on the Role of Research in the Project Design

26. The GEF Project Document describes the project as:
“A demonstration programme for biodiversity conservation and dryland ecosystem restoration...”
27. The project objective (according to the logframe) is:

“To develop models for the conservation of biodiversity and rehabilitation of degraded rangelands, and to develop sustainable management systems using indigenous knowledge.”
28. As noted previously, no definition of model is given in the ProDoc. This has meant that the nature of the “model” is undefined and therefore the type of research needed for the model is undefined. However, in the project document, research was identified as a significant component of the project:
29. Full Project Brief: Project Summary (page 3) (Note: Our highlighting)

“This project is a demonstration programme for biodiversity conservation and dryland ecosystem restoration in the arid and semi-arid zones of Africa.

*The project will **combine** community based **indigenous knowledge**, the **findings of scientific research** and **past practical experience** to rehabilitate degraded ecosystems and conserve biodiversity by **developing** sustainable natural resource management systems.*

*A **major goal** of the project is to facilitate an **exchange of knowledge** and experience between three comparable but different situations and **develop models**, which can be transferred elsewhere within the continent. **Technology transfer** and **supporting research** will be a **vital part** of the project”.*
30. We have taken the view that research includes capture and synthesis of indigenous knowledge, literature reviews, finding solutions to problems, technology transfer, and

communication of ideas and applied or targeted, site-specific studies. Many different types of research questions can be found throughout the project document (they are listed in Appendix C). The nature of the research varies from a literature review to long-term field investigations. In general the context in which research is mentioned suggests that the aim of the research is normally to inform the community in its decision making for range and indigenous vegetation management, but the linkage between research and the development of sustainable management systems is not clear.

31. In particular the “principal task” of the targeted research is described in Section 3 (para 36 p12) as to collect, design, conduct, analyze and synthesize data, together with training for this purpose. In contradiction, the document suggests that only part of the targeted research includes data collection for the database (Section 4 para 53 p15). However this activity is not mentioned in the log frame under Outcome 6 (targeted research), although it reappears in Appendix VI (p60).
32. We found that, as the reasons, purpose and objectives of the research component were not made clear from the start; there have been serious misunderstandings and a lack of research leadership in the field during project implementation, especially with regard to the “targeted research” component.
33. **Regional Database (RD)** According to the Project document, the regional database “will contribute significantly to the integrated management of land, water and biodiversity” (Section 4, Para 45 p 13). Why or how this will happen is not indicated. The log frame indicates that the database will consist of up to 40 years of historical data, while the M & E section indicates there will be repeated surveys after 5 and 10 years (Section 9 para 82 p28). It is not explicitly stated that the RD will be used for model development, but this is implied. Nothing is said as to how the national and regional databases will be sustained beyond the end of the project, where they will be located institutionally, and how this will be financed.

Necessary conditions for community-based management

34. One of the most serious weaknesses of the project design is that the Prodoc gives no indication that those who developed this project had any experience with community-based management of natural resources. The design calls for the marriage of traditional knowledge with scientific and practical experience, rehabilitation techniques, databases and research, participatory approaches and the like. But there is no apparent recognition that the development of a management system requires first that there be a resource manager. For any type of natural resource management, you have to have a management authority – an individual or an institution that is empowered to control access to the resource and that can establish and impose rules governing the use of the resource. For community-based management you have to have an empowered community-based institutional structure.
35. In the absence of empowered community managers, one must be created before one can start to develop and test community-based range/vegetation management systems. CBNRM success stories across the continent would indicate that the following are key aspects in the development of empowered community management structures:
 - The creation of such structures must be voluntary. A single village or a group of villages may come together to form a management structure ;
 - Community management institutions that will manage community lands and resources should be representative of the entire community.

- Before the community group can be empowered to control access rights, they need to negotiate and come to agreement with their neighbors on the limits of the lands/resources that they are to manage. This often takes a considerable period of time.
 - Finally, and most importantly, the community management structure must be empowered by government to control access and to manage “their” lands/resources.
36. Control of access is the key. Community managers must be able to impose rules governing the use of resources on their own members. People from outside the community wishing to access the community’s resources must negotiate conditions of access with the empowered community management structure. Some object to the idea of the need for defined limits to the lands/resources to be managed. If community-managers could be empowered to control access without limits being defined, so much the better. However, the MTR Team is unaware of CBNRM success stories that do not involve such a definition of limits.
37. **Other key elements of successful CBNRM** generally include the following:
- Effective institutional capacity development for community managers in the following areas:
 - Good governance
 - Accounting and business management skills (communities need to manage their lands as a profit-making business)
 - Natural resource management capacities
 - Equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of resource management;
 - Generation of revenues from the resources managed. Revenues should cover management costs and generate revenues/benefits for community members and the community as a whole while generating tax revenues for appropriate levels of government
 - Effective support from government/authorities in cases of conflict between community managers and outsiders;
 - A minimum level of monitoring of key agreed indicators and oversight by appropriate government institutions
38. The IVP Prodoc is striking in its lack of any attention to these critical elements of community-based natural resource management.

Corrective Measures to Address Design Weaknesses

39. **General** The highest level decision-making body on the project is the Regional Policy Steering Committee (RPSC). It is their responsibility to ensure that the project remains focused on the Project Objective and the Outcomes. It is the role of UNEP/GEF and UNDP/GEF to ensure that IVP remains focused on biodiversity conservation. The annual meeting of the RPSC is the principal venue for fulfilling these functions.
40. At the time of the January 2004 RPSC meeting, both the UNEP/GEF and the UNDP/GEF representatives who are directly responsible for supervision of IVP, were either hospitalized or recovering from surgery and did not attend this meeting. By the time of the February 28, 2005 RPSC meeting, both UNEP/GEF and UNDP/GEF realized that IVP had deviated substantially from its course and pushed for several recommendations that were adopted by the RPSC. The RPSC called for a much greater focus on biodiversity conservation and on clear linkages between alternative livelihoods and biodiversity. IVP teams were told to focus

on the activities identified in the Community Actions Plans (CAP) that were linked with biodiversity.

41. UNEP/UNDP/GEF also stressed the need for establishing an M&E system and for modifying the project to conform with the new BD2 guidelines and indicators. It was further decided that the logframe indicators would be revised and it was recommended (but not required) that national programs revise their logframes to be in conformity with BD2 and with local conditions. The lack of progress and performance on the part of Oslo was a major topic at the March RPSC. The RPSC instructed UNOPS, in consultation with UNEP, to establish MOU and contracts with national institutions to conduct research needed by the project. UNEP/GEF and UNDP/GEF pushed for the Mid-Term Review to be held at an early date in order to deal in a much more substantive fashion with both design and implementation issues raised at the February RPSC.
42. It is noteworthy that, even in the minutes of the February 2005 RPSC, the key language of the Project Objective does not appear – there is no mention of the development of models or systems of management of the indigenous vegetation (although there is some mention in the annual reports that were presented at that meeting). There is a great deal of emphasis on biodiversity and the need for explicit linkages between project activities and biodiversity conservation, but it is never made explicit that biodiversity is to be conserved and degraded rangelands are to be rehabilitated through the development of community-based management of these rangelands. The Project Objective remained effectively hidden in the Prodoc appendix.
43. **Corrective measures taken** By the time of the MTR, some measures had been taken to address the basic weaknesses of the project design. Botswana had developed a strategy for achieving community-based management of indigenous vegetation. Kenya had just completed a revised country-level logframe. The MTR Team finds that Kenya country level logframe was very well done and that it addressed some of the basic weaknesses of the overall project logframe identified above. Outcomes 1 (management systems) & 3 (rehabilitation) have been combined into one outcome as has have Outcomes 2 (regional database) and 6 (targeted research). Much better impact indicators were developed. At the time of the Evaluation, Kenya was proceeding to then do site specific logframes. Unfortunately, the E-Team found little evidence that the improved strategic logic of the logframe had as yet been demonstrably translated into improved strategic interventions in the field.
44. Botswana has redone the indicators to their logframe and they have been significantly strengthened. It was reported by the national consultant in Mali that the Mali IVP team has also redone their logframe. This was not discovered during the Team leader's mission there. At the time that this first draft evaluation report was completed, there had be no response to a request to the national consultant to send an electronic copy at the time that this first draft was completed.
45. Finally, the planning for this MTR shows quite clearly that both UNEP/GEF and UNDP/GEF had taken the situation on this project very seriously. To their great frustration, when preparing the MTR, the UNOPS contract amendment with Oslo had not yet been completed as directed by the RPSC (it remained uncompleted until some four weeks after the MTR's preliminary findings has been presented to the RPSC in Nairobi in late September 2005 (even though during this meeting an agreement was reached with the Oslo project leader). Both UNEP/GEF and UNDP/GEF made it very clear to the MTR team leader-to-be, as early as

April 2005, that there were very serious problems with the project and that they were counting on the MTR to recommend major changes to the project. For team leader, they were looking for a senior professional with extensive experience in natural resource management, project design, implementation and evaluation and experienced with GEF – someone who could “see between the lines”, as they put it.

46. As further evidence of the importance placed on the MTR, UNEP, UNDP and UNOPS jointly decided that they needed to hire a separate team member with the appropriate qualifications to evaluate the research component, eventually hiring a professional who had also served as a director of research for a university.
47. **Key findings related to corrective measures** taken to correct the deficiencies of project design are the following. Overall, the project remains poorly focused. None of the three country teams or other key actors was clearly focused on the Project Objective. Outcomes, outputs and activities were too often being developed with little strategic analysis of how they are linked to the Project Objective. Key terms like “model” and targeted research remained undefined. Alternative livelihoods have grown to become a major thrust of the project, but they are being developed in the absence of effective range management systems. Alternative livelihoods are even being developed in towns and villages that will never be included in such management systems. And the strategic linkage of the alternative livelihoods to the project objective is often weak. The root cause analyses have been somewhat improved through Community Action Plans (CAPs), but the CAPs are generally not focused on the specific lands where management systems will be developed. Most importantly, many of the key actors still have not recognized that one must have an empowered community management authority before one can begin to develop community-based range management systems. These essential pre-conditions for the testing of management systems have not yet been put into place at any of the sites.

Findings on Project Implementation

Progress towards achievement of the Project Objective

48. Key findings are presented for each country in the same order that the countries were visited.

Findings Botswana

49. **General situation** The present situation on the three IVP pilot sites in Botswana is one of open access to rangelands. In the dry season, the pastures grasses are depleted well before the beginning of the next rainy season because of open access overgrazing. There is no functional management authority at any of the sites and certainly no community-based management authority. Sustainable management is not possible under these conditions. The principal cause of land degradation is from open access overgrazing. Widespread over-harvest of range (veld) products is another result of open access.
50. **Particular challenges** There are a number of rather unique conditions that pose an especially difficult challenge to the development of CBRM in Botswana:
 51. **Livestock are not herded** – they are left to roam free all day (and frequently at night). Range management requires control over the timing and movement of livestock. This is generally done with either fences and/or herders. Fencing is very expensive and is probably not financially viable. To get people to once again invest in herding their

animals will require a quite radical change in current practices. Livestock owners largely gave up herding their livestock about the time of Independence.

52. **Conflicting water and grazing rights** All or most Botswana have the right to pasture their livestock on communal lands. However, there has been a longstanding government program of allocation of water rights on communal lands to individuals. Privately owned boreholes are widely found on communal lands. More precisely, Land Boards grant individuals the rights to drill and equip boreholes on communal lands. In the dry season, control of water gives one *de facto* control of the range resource – provided the distance to other water points is sufficiently long. A very recent court decision reconfirmed that borehole owners do not have legal control over the range/vegetation – only the water. Livestock are prevented from access to water by a fence around the borehole (controlled by a laborer). Most borehole owners are not from the local village. They are generally people of wealth and power from the larger cities. The borehole is often managed by a family relative with little education. This all serves to complicate the development of community-based range management systems.
53. **Dual grazing rights** A large portion of the communal lands in Botswana have been divided into privately leased “ranches” over the past 30 years. Indeed, the thrust of government policies and programs has favored this *de facto* privatization of the communal lands. Botswana ranchers, however, have dual grazing rights. They can pasture their livestock on communal lands until the pasture is depleted, then move their livestock back onto their ranch for the duration of the dry season. It is not known how important this factor of dual grazing rights is as a cause of land degradation. It is also a barrier to the development of CBRM.
54. **Breakdown in traditional land/pasture rights** Like the Mali/Nara and Kenya sites, the pilot communities in Botswana once had traditionally defined community land rights with boundaries mutually recognized by each community and its neighbors. These *dithota* are no longer operational because they are not legally recognized. However, the existence of these traditionally recognized boundaries should be built upon as a base to facilitate the development of community-based management systems.
55. **High level of government subsidies** The government has very generous subsidy programs for ranches, for the drilling/equipping of boreholes, for supplemental feeding of livestock during droughts, etc. These subsidies sometimes provide disincentives for sustainable range management on communal lands. For example, subsidies for supplemental feeding during droughts may result in much larger numbers of livestock being carried through a drought period – with consequently higher pressures on the range.
56. **Overall impact of the particular challenges** Botswana probably represents the most difficult challenge of the three countries for the development of CBRM – not impossible, just difficult.
57. **Particular opportunities:** The other two countries are not known to have functioning, proven or promising full-blown range management systems within the country. Botswana has the advantage of having large numbers of privately-managed leasehold ranches, some going back to the 1970s, and large numbers of freehold farms/ranches, some going back over a hundred years. Although most leasehold ranches practice little range management, some small percentage of the leasehold ranchers are said to be good land/range managers. Even less is known about the freehold farmers, but, because many or most actually live on their

farms/ranches, one could expect to have a much higher percentage of owners practicing good land husbandry. Although these two sources of expertise have not yet been exploited by IVP, they represent a resource that is largely absent in Mali and that is probably only weakly developed in Kenya. Ways of assessing and accessing this resource for range and indigenous vegetation management should therefore be explored.

58. **Pre-conditions for CBRM** Representative Interim Resource Management Committees have been created at all pilot sites. As the name implies, the Botswana IVP team is working towards the development of community management institutions that must then be empowered to manage their rangelands. Approximate boundaries of the lands to be managed have been determined and negotiation within adjoining communities over the precise boundaries is underway – no significant problems have been encountered to date. The Interim Committees have not been registered as legal constituted institutions. The IVP team has set the target of having them legally registered as trusts by the end of this year 2005. Similar trusts have been set up for the community-based wildlife management program in Botswana (which is actually more of a revenue sharing scheme than an empowerment of communities for wildlife management). At the briefing that the MTR team leader gave at UNDP/Botswana, one person pointed out that, at present, the registration of a community group as a trust can sometimes take two years or more. This would indicate that IVP will need to make this a high priority.
59. **Major constraint identified** The MTR Leader met with three of the Interim Committees or subcommittees. All committees recognize that they cannot manage (or even protect) “their” resources unless government transfers control and management rights to them. All of them clearly wish to be so empowered. Most of them have quite clear ideas about some of the measures they would like to implement if they were so empowered. The biggest potential constraint to the achievement of the Project Objective in Botswana is the lack of an appropriate legal mechanism for empowering these Trusts. The Project commissioned a review of the legal framework in 2004 and to propose possible legal options. The review revealed that the legal framework was clearly not developed for the empowerment of community managers and that there are no clearly defined, easily applicable legal mechanisms for doing this. Only the government can empower community managers, and, at the time of the MTR, the Government of Botswana had not yet moved forward on this issue – they have not yet identified the specific legal instruments that will be used to empower community managers at each pilot site.
60. While the IVP Team has been working with local government officials at the three sites to identify and develop potential mechanisms for empowerment of the Trusts, it is not at all clear that any of these local officials would actually use these tools to empower the community groups without a clear go ahead from central level of government. Empowerment is not something that the project team can do – only the government can empower the community managers.
61. **Planning** Maps of the pilot communities’ lands have been produced by local government services. Potential management options were identified and debated during the preparation of the CAPs, but development of the actual range/veld management systems has scarcely begun. Discussions with the Interim Committees revealed that they do have some clear ideas of what they would like to do if they were empowered to control access to “their” lands.
62. **Micro-projects** IVP has dedicated a great deal of its time and resources to the development of Community Action Plans (CAPs) and to the identification, funding and development of

micro-projects identified by the communities in the CAPs. IVP Botswana views the micro-projects as a buy-in to obtain the communities trust and support. The revenues/benefits to be generated by the micro-projects are generally not based on the sustainable management of range/veld resources. There has been little analysis of the financial/economic viability of the activities funded. The strategic linkages between micro-projects and the Project Objective often appears weak. As an example, one of the micro-projects visited is a rather sophisticated vegetable gardening project for unemployed youth.

63. Another popular type of micro-project of more mixed strategic value that IVP has funded is for “drift fences”. This is a local term that simply refers to fences around areas where rain-fed agriculture will be practiced. The areas fenced are typically much larger than the area that will be cultivated – typically around 400 ha. The project has not analyzed the ecological sustainability of the rain-fed agriculture. Fencing these areas may lead to an overall increase of deforestation (and loss of biodiversity) for conversion to fields. On a more positive note, the uncultivated portions of the fenced areas present real opportunities for experimenting with range management techniques and the project has negotiated agreement with drift fence committees that mini-management plans will be established for the areas enclosed within these fences.
64. **Range management planning** IVP Botswana has not yet begun the preparation of range management plans, but this has been scheduled in the work plan. They plan to contract this work out and they only have adequate funds to prepare two plans.
65. **Monitoring and evaluation** Transects for ecological monitoring have been set up around the pilot villages. The location of the transects was done by Professor Oba of Noragric. The first set of measurements of the transects had recently been made by the Range Ecology Division of the Department of Crop Production and Forestry.
66. **Financial management** The financial situation Botswana has higher operating costs than the other two countries and will probably be the first to run out of money. The IVP estimates that this will occur sometime between the end of 2006 and June 2007. At the time of the MTR, IVP was planning to develop six formal range/natural resource management plans. However, their budget only allows them to fund two of them. They were seeking additional funding for the others.
67. The installation of the Atlas financial accounting software in early 2004 led to major delays in funding of the micro-projects during 2004. Some of the communities become highly frustrated with the project because of this, partially offsetting the purpose of the micro-projects.
68. **Summary Findings – Botswana**
 - Pilot communities have been organized into representative management structures;
 - Communities structures recognize that they can do nothing unless they are empowered by the State to control access to “their” lands and resources. They want to have this control;
 - The specific legal mechanisms for empowering each community management structure have not been clearly identified by government;
 - Alternative livelihoods activities are generally not based on the resources to be managed and are of mixed quality but have generally been successful in gaining the good-will of the communities towards the project.

69. **Key challenges:**

- Mobilization of the political will for the empowerment of community managers to be able to control access and to manage their rangelands;
- Convincing community managers of the benefits of, and the necessity of, herding their animals;
- Refocusing of the project efforts towards achievement of the Project Objective;
- Ensuring that the preparation of range management plans by contracted consultants remains a strongly participatory planning process putting the communities up front. Plan need to be realistic and based on the means at the disposal of the communities;
- Integration of the private bore-hole owners into community-based range management systems
- Identification and mobilization of practical, hand-on expertise in range management ;
- Accomplishing this in the short period of time remaining;

70. **Summary of Progress:** The 5 yr project was at three years and two months in September 2005. Progress towards achievement of the Project Objective is Moderately Unsatisfactory.

Findings Mali

71. Neither the MTR Team Leader nor the national consultant had the opportunity to visit the Bamba site in Mali. Most of the findings, except where noted, are based on the Nara site.
72. **The general situation** is one of open access grazing. Nara is an area of major transborder transhumance with large numbers of transhumants descending down from Mauritania early in the dry season. The dry season runs from October to mid-June and pasture grasses have all been consumed by as early as January – a sign of severe overgrazing. Surprisingly, the MTR Team saw some transhumants living in their tents at a considerable distance from the nearest village, and who had never left during the entire 2005 rainy season. There is no management authority. Sustainable management is not possible under these existing conditions.
73. The principal cause of land degradation is from open access overgrazing. The deep sandy soils are amazingly resistant to soil erosion and support a full cover of annual grasses when rains are adequate. These sandy soil rangelands might be very degraded in terms of species composition and productivity – but such information was not available. As is typical in the Sahel, the heavier soils are much more susceptible to land degradation. Some sites with heavy soils are largely without grass cover and are undergoing water erosion. Unsustainable over-harvest of range products is another result of open access.

Particular challenges

74. **The integration of transhumants** complicates the management systems to be set up. Of great interest here is the early positive experience of the UNEP/UNDP/GEF Senegal/Mauritania Biodiversity Project in the Senegal River Valley between the two countries (more on this in recommendations).
75. **Conflicts with rainfed agriculture** Rainfed agriculture is a major, and shifting, land use on sandy soils in the Nara Circle. Rainfed agriculture is practiced on a large scale on the deep sandy soils with little relief, but agriculture is a very high risk proposition with such low rainfall. The year before the MTR, farmers had no harvest for lack of rain. During the MTR, they were preparing for a bumper harvest. Fallows on the deep sandy soils

seem to revegetate quite well. A huge area just south of the town of Nara was formerly cultivated and is now “recovering”.

Particular Opportunities

76. **Decentralization** Mali has a well-developed, strong program of decentralization. This provides a very favorable policy context in support of empowerment of communities for natural resource management. In comparison to Botswana, empowerment in Mali is not expected to be a significant constraint in.
77. **Traditional land rights** Villages typically have well defined *terroir* or traditional village lands with relatively well-defined boundaries. These traditional rights can form a base upon which to built range management systems.
78. **Boreholes** Unlike Botswana, boreholes are owned by the communes – and they are not as numerous. This should facilitate their integration into CBRM systems.
79. **Potential for CB dryland forest management** The existence of a commercial fuelwood supply zone extending approximately 20 km out along roads radiating out from Nara presents the opportunity for integrating revenue earning, dryland forest management into range management systems within this area.
80. **Pre-Conditions for CBRM** The Nara Circle and the Bamba site are quite large geographic areas. IVP-Mali is working at many sites -- mostly on micro-projects. The specific pilot communities for the development of range management systems have not been selected. There was little indication that the field teams are working towards the development of CBRM systems. The project team said that they have tried to make sense out of the Prodoc the best that they could and that they have never had any clear guidelines or orientation on how to develop the project. They have not been working towards the development of CBRM. The MTR Team met the Consultative Committee for Nara Circle and questioned them on the Project Objective. They did not know/understand what the Project Objective is.
81. Representative community or user group/economic interest groups/committees have been created at some, but not all, project sites. They are not legal entities. The process of validating/identifying clearly defined boundaries has not begun. Strategies for integrating transhumants in range management systems have not been developed, nor has there been a dialogue with transhumants towards this end. The IVP Team says that they could use a legal tool called a “*convention locale*” to empower communities for range/resource management. They have already used it successfully to empower community groups for a fisheries management intervention. This is a fascinating management strategy building on a traditional technique whereby some of the fish living in shallow lakes/ponds that routinely or frequently dry up during the dry season are kept alive during the dry season in shallow wells.
82. The Project enjoys good integration and support with local authorities and local technical services of the government. The highest government authority in Nara (the *prefet*) is supportive of the proposal to use *convention locale* to empower pilot communities.
83. A GIS/database has been developed for the Nara and Bamba sites. It has been done without any guidelines from Oslo or the RCU. The information has been developed for the entire Circle of Nara and for a similarly large area for Bamba. Most of the GIS/database information seems to be too general to be of much use for range management at the

community level of the *terroir*. No detailed maps of the village *terroirs* have been produced showing vegetation types, water points, land use, land degradation, etc. – the type of maps that would be most useful for developing pilot CBRM systems. The database was developed because the National IVP team saw it as an outcome in the Prodoc. It has not been developed as a strategically important tool that will contribute towards achievement of the Project Objective.

84. Development of the range management systems has not begun.
85. **Support for communal development plans** Instead of CAPs, the project in Mali has invested in improvements to communal social, economic and cultural development plans (PDSECs) – to strengthen the environmental aspects of the plans. One example of a completed PDSEC that had been supported by IVP was provided. A quick search of the section on problem analysis showed that overgrazing had been correctly identified as a key problem. But a search through the section on solutions/development options for addressing the key problems showed that range/pasture management was not listed as one of the options – yet another indicator that the project has not been working towards the Project Objective.
86. **Micro-projects** Most of the recent and current efforts of the project have been invested in identification, funding and development of micro-projects. Micro-projects were viewed as a buy-in to obtain peoples trust and support. The revenues to be generated are generally not based on the sustainable management of range resources and strategic linkages to the Project Objective are weak.
87. **Treatment of symptoms of land degradation** In Nara Circle, IVP is helping eight communities fence in 4 ha. exclosures (*mise en défense*) that IVP/Mali calls biodiversity sites. One such site was established on very heavily used, degraded rangelands next to a “*mare*” or shallow lake, at Keybane. The metal mesh fence had been completed near the beginning of the 2005 rainy season. This fenced site once again demonstrated the incredible capacity of Sahelian ecosystems to recover quickly when grazing pressures are eliminated or diminished. A very healthy stand of an unidentified grass that is prized for making brooms had developed and a few stems of the perennial grass *Andropogon gayanus* had appeared on the site although it, and other perennials, are almost totally absent on the surrounding open access rangelands. Where they don’t already exist, such fenced exclosures can be very effective for demonstrating what can be done with grazing control. Such plots, however, should only be seen as demos. The challenge facing the project is to develop range management systems that can be applied to an entire *terroir* or group of *terroirs*.
88. Another site of considerable interest was visited. Several hectares of severely degraded land on heavy soils had been very intensively treated with large, four-meter “half-moon” soil and water conservation structures that had been built by hand labor provided by the villagers. This represents a huge investment of manual labor over a site of a few hectares. A single tree seedling had been planted in the large sunken bed upslope from each half-moon – no forage grasses or agricultural crops had been planted. The structures were well designed – probably over-designed, with the exception that the arms of adjacent half-moon were tied together allowing no possibility for overflow around the sides (without overtopping and breaking the half-moon ridges themselves) during exceptionally heavy rains. Fencing that IVP had promised to provide, had not yet been furnished. In the meantime, the site had been protected from livestock with guards. IVP has promised to provide a well or borehole (a very sizable investment in a village that may not be selected as a range management pilot village) for the village – whose nearest water source is 7 km away.

89. The techniques employed had been done under the supervision of the local forester, when asked his vision for the future of this technique, he replied that it should be replicated over all the degraded sites. It is the opinion of the MTR team that this is highly unrealistic. The huge investments in labor and fencing can not be justified for the increased firewood and grass production that this type of intervention can provide. Where this technique has been spontaneously replicated in the Sahel (Tahoua area of Niger in the late 1980s) is where it has been used by farmers to crop sorghum and millet. This might be a viable application at Nara – all it would take is for a few sorghum or millet seeds to be dropped accidentally into a half moon for people to discover this. Ironically, if this technique does prove popular for this, it will probably lead to further conversion of degraded rangelands into new agricultural lands.
90. Again, these intensive soil conservation and water conservation are treating the symptoms of land degradation rather than addressing the main cause – that of open access overgrazing. It is not a technique that can be applied and replicated over large areas of degraded lands.
91. **Summary -- Mali:**
Key challenges:
- Refocusing of the project on the project objective;
 - Integration of transhumants into the CBRM systems to be developed;
 - Mobilization of technical expertise in range management in support of IVP-Mali.
92. **Summary of Progress:** Progress towards achievement of the Project Objective is Unsatisfactory.

Findings Kenya

93. **General Situation** The two Kenya sites in northwestern (Turkana) and northern Kenya (Marsabit) are the most degraded of the pilot sites in the three countries (with the possible exception of Bamba site in Mali that was not visited). Some of the drylands between Ludwar and Lake Turkana are like a “moonscape”. Overgrazing is the main direct cause of this degradation and unsustainable use of specific products/species is a contributing factor. Both sites have two highly variable, unreliable rainy seasons per year – pasture grasses are typically consumed well before the end of each dry season. Traditional range management systems were probably both; a) more highly developed at the Kenya sites and; b) more intact today than in the other countries – some communities still practice deferred grazing, but only on an exceptional basis. Pasture rights between clans are still relatively well respected. Grazing within a clan’s rangelands are primarily open access. In some exceptional cases, the traditional local council of elders of the Turkana, with the support of government appointed “chiefs”, are still able to organize deferred grazing (locally called *epaka*) during the rainy season to give degraded areas a rest and a chance to partially regenerate. Unlike the Botswana and Mali sites, the Kenyan sites have a long history of rangeland projects, including IPAL, TREMU, NORAD and the most recent GTZ Marsabit Development Program.

Particular challenges unique to Kenya

94. **Non-representative traditional authority structure** The council of elders of the Turkana are composed of the oldest men in the group. They are not elected, there are no women or minority/disadvantaged groups represented. The development and empowerment of a more

representative community-management authority while retaining the support of the council of elders presents a particular challenge.

95. **Security** Both sites have security problems and IVP field teams frequently have to hire the services of armed guards to accompany them in the field. Ethnic tensions exploded into violence in the Hurri Hills in July 2005, making work at this site impossible at the time of the MTR.

Challenges particular to the Turkana/Turkwell Site

96. **Conversion to agriculture** is the major threat to the riverine forest in Turkana and in the Hurri Hills in the northern extremity of the Marsabit site. Conversion to agriculture along the Turkwell River is primarily a function of the construction of a dam along the upper Turkwell and the partial regularization of water flow permitting irrigated agriculture, both gravity fed and pump-irrigated. Conversion destroys the forest and leaves herders cut off from access to the river, disrupting grazing systems. Salt build-up is a major problem on irrigated lands, at least locally.
97. **Mix of private and communal tenure** The Turkana site is located along the length of the Turkwell River. The Turkwell River has a wide floodplain with a riverine forest. Traditional land tenure has the trees being privately owned with the herbaceous/range vegetation underneath communally owned. The privately owned riverine forests are called *ekwar*. Integrating private ownership of trees with communal ownership of the undergrowth presents a particular challenge. Increasing privatization might increase the risks of conversion to agriculture. Strengthening communal rights to the *ekwar* as part of the overall communal grazing systems, might help to constrain conversion to agriculture.

Particular opportunities

98. **CBRM pre-conditions adequately filled to move forward quickly** The remnants of the traditional authority structure and of the traditional range management systems should allow the project to move forward quickly on the development and testing of range management systems. In Kenya, the project can begin to test and restore and improve on traditional systems without the need to go through the steps of legally empowering the community management structure first. (It would still be important that the community management structures be formally/legally empowered before the end of the project).
99. **Potential for natural forest management** The often dense, closed-canopy riverine forests present a significant potential for natural forest management, especially those located relatively close to urban centers.

Pre-conditions for CBRM

100. The Project is working with numerous villages/communities. At Turkana, it has not selected the specific villages/ communities that it will work with for the development of range/vegetation management models. Likewise, the process of validating/identifying access rights and clearly defined boundaries for pilot CBRM model development has not begun. In Turkana, the IVP did not give the impression that it is clearly working towards the development of CBRM. The national team leader said they have decided to focus on the *ekwar* within the riverine forest. IVP Kenya has been helping organize communities it works with into representative structures. They are seeking to have them registered as

Environmental Management Committees under the Environmental Management Act. There is some uncertainty whether this is an appropriate legal status for the empowerment of communities for CBRM.

101. Legal tools for empowerment were discussed with the acting District Commissioner in Ludwar. There was considerable uncertainty about the specifics of how empowerment can be done, but a generally positive indication of support for seeking a solution. Later the same question was raised in Nairobi with the Director of Range Management in the Ministry of Livestock. He predicts that Kenya's new National Land Policy will be adopted within 3-6 mos. He said it is very supportive of community empowerment for resource management and predicts that the policy will be quickly translated into law. He felt that the IVP communities could potentially serve as pilot communities for empowerment under the new policy/law. The project is uncertain about its ability to legalize the communities' rights before the end of the project. The MTR considers legal empowerment to be essential to sustainability.
102. At Turkana, the representativeness of the EMC is not always clear. IVP is presently focused on the *ekwar* and the owners of the *ekwar*. But the overall grazing system includes the *ekwar*, a broad area of dry plains and then even more distant, steep large hills/small mountains. Only some of the families are *ekwar* owners. Dry season grazing is focused on both the riverine forest along the river and the hill rangelands – where dams have been constructed for watering livestock. Much of the dry plains is out of reach of water points in the dry season. All of the dry and wet season grazing lands need to be integrated into range management systems and all of the livestock owners that exploit these lands need to be represented in the community management structures/EMC.
103. The project seems to be more advanced in fulfilling the pre-conditions for CBRM at Marsabit. Unfortunately, time did not permit the MTR team leader to visit this site. The Kenya project team reports they have initiated the negotiation of inter-community and intra-community agreements on boundaries of grazing management areas and are working on drafting by-laws for regulating access and control of range resources.
104. **The strong focus on *ekwars*** at Turkana does not seem appropriate. They are the least degraded element of the grazing system. They are a critical part, but geographically, only a small part of the overall grazing system. Some detailed vegetation mapping has been done in Hurri Hills and detailed mapping of some of the *ekwars* has been done in Turkana.
105. **Dramatic results from deferred grazing** The project supported the development of three Community Actions Plans in Turkana. In two of the CAPs, the communities requested IVP assistance to help them reinstitute their traditional *epaka* deferred grazing system – which consists of excluding livestock from a degraded site in need of regeneration during the rainy season or a series of rainy seasons. IVP helped the village of Kaitese do this on degraded dry plains -- this site was visited by the MTR. The results are very positive and visually dramatic. Livestock have been excluded during each rainy season for the past two years – a total of four rainy seasons. An abundant natural regeneration of *Acacia tortillis* seedlings has been established –the seedlings average about 40 cm in height and there appeared to be about 1500 seedlings per hectare (at the site visited). However, no baseline was established prior to the intervention and no monitoring has been done. It is not known how the soil cover has changed and whether the species composition and productivity of the grasses has changed. IVP doesn't know the size of the area but thinks it is about 3000 ha. Enforcement was done by the local council of elders. Anyone caught grazing on the site during the closed period would be fined a goat.

106. The intervention at Kaitese is by far the single most positive range management technique developed by IVP and reported or seen in all three countries. It is an excellent example of what can be done with empowered community leaders controlling the use of rangelands without the use of fences in order to rehabilitate degraded lands – without any significant investments being needed. The most discouraging aspect of the intervention, however, is that the IVP team did not seem to attach any particular importance to it. They seemed to accord it no greater value than a beekeeping micro-project or the development of a community nursery.
107. **Micro-projects** The IVP Kenya team has also invested most of their resources in micro-projects. These micro-projects seem to be viewed here by IVP as both a means to develop the trust of the communities and as ends in themselves. At Turkwell, the MTR Team met a group that had previously received training in beekeeping and beehives from an NGO and that had been given new training and more beehives (of a different model) from IVP. Considerable effort was expended in assisting communities to produce and plant exotic fruit trees at wide spacing in irrigated fields near Turkwell. About 95% or more of the fruit trees died – from salt buildup in the soils. The villagers reported that they told the IVP staff that the fruit trees would not do well on these sites. The strategic linkage between this intervention and the Project Objective was about the weakest of any of the micro-projects encountered in the three countries. Improving the productivity of irrigated agriculture would probably result in increased conversion of riverine forests to agriculture. Two project-supported community tree nurseries were visited. They were mostly full of exotic ornamentals and exotic fruit trees.
108. **Community Action Plans** At Turkwell, a number of community members complained strongly that IVP had not fulfilled their commitments to fund the full range of activities they had identified in their CAP. The unfunded activities, like the ones that had been funded, were not directly related to the Project Objective.
109. **Privatization of rangelands?** At another site between Ludwar and Lake Turkana, the project has been supporting the creation of dry season pasture reserves by individuals who fence off areas of communal pasture using thornbush branches. IVP estimates that about 100 people have fenced off their own pieces of rangelands. The site visited was said by IVP to be about 4 km² – fenced by a single individual. The site is quite remote from water and is traditionally used by multiple groups. No intergroup agreements have been negotiated. It appears that the project is supporting a *de facto* privatization of communal lands used by multiple groups – without doing any serious analysis and strategic planning of the intervention. The huge demand for thornbush branches is also degrading the woody cover – no sustainable techniques of selective cutting of individuals branches has been promoted by the project.
110. **Partnerships and private sector involvement** IVP has established good working partnerships with government services and other actors in the area. IVP has also been working closely with a private sector group that is promoting non-destructive techniques for the harvest of gums and resins and who is actively purchasing these products from communities throughout the area.
111. **Ecological monitoring** transects have been located at the Turkana and the Marsabit sites and first measurements have been made. Transects at Turkana were located by the IVP National Liaison officer after receiving the training given by Oslo/Noragric. The Turkana

transects are located exclusively in the *ekwar* in the riverine forests along the Turkwell—the least degraded component of the rangelands.

Summary -- Kenya

112. Key Challenges:

- Refocusing of the project towards achievement of the Project Objective
- Development of range management systems that include all of the rangelands used during the course of the year and all of the livestock owners who use them.
- Mobilization of technical expertise in range management in support of IVP-Kenya.
- Legal empowerment of pilot communities before the end of the project.

113. Summary -- Progress towards achievement of the project objective is modest at best. However, the potential for developing strong community-based range management systems appears greatest in Kenya.

Research Findings

Main General Findings - Research

- 114. Communication Breakdown** From the start there has been a communication failure between partners, especially between Oslo on the one side and most of the other members of the RPSC on the other. As a result, relationships have deteriorated almost to the point of complete failure.
- 115.** Communication between the participants has been very poor. It was found that different versions of key documents were being used in different locations, and some documents had not been circulated. The style of some correspondence has been abrasive and this has exacerbated the situation. There is no numbering system for documents, and some are undated, so that it is difficult to know if one has all the material, or even whether one has the latest version. There were disagreements as to whether updates of documents had been sent to the regional coordinator, and UNOPS.
- 116.** There has been a serious problem of communication between Oslo and the Francophone partners, which was compounded by the almost complete absence of visits by both Oslo research leaders to Mali. Apart from the MSc and data collection training, Mali had been almost completely ignored by Oslo.
- 117.** There have also been significant administrative delays, caused by misunderstandings and a lack of trust between some of the partners. In particular there has been an unacceptable delay in signing the revised Oslo/UN contract.
- 118.** On the Oslo side, one of the problems was inadequate administrative capacity. However we found that Oslo had recently taken steps internally to address the problem by making additional administrative appointments, and that there had been an improvement in administrative communications as a result.
- 119. Key terms undefined** From the outset, there have been significant differences in the interpretation of the role and nature of research between participants. At the time of the MTR, there is no common understanding or agreement about the meaning of the word “model”, despite its importance in the project document. According to the Research Plan (Section 3 p4)

it appears to mean an analytical predictive (computer) model, although this is far from clear. For others it is a field demonstration of best practice (“a functioning example of a community-based range management system. The RC would add to this last definition, “and the definition of the essential preconditions and the processes necessary to arrive at this condition”. Although members of the RPSC were fully aware of the lack of common definition, nothing was done to resolve this.

120. Another critical factor was the time-scale for the application of research findings in the field. National offices expect all research findings to be implemented within the lifetime of the project.
121. The term “targeted research” was also not defined. The University of Oslo research leaders considered this to be essentially all field research, including the collection of bio-data, while in the national offices targeted research was assumed to be only short-term site-specific problem solving work, such as short-term field trials of alternative species, work on invasive species, effects of fire, storage of seeds, or literature studies to provide advice on immediate technical problems and concerns at the sites.
122. **Role and Value of Research not Clear** We found no agreement on the value, need for, and importance of research on this project. In Oslo it was a major component (as suggested by the project summary), while in the field it played a minor role (e.g., as in the Project Objective). In particular there was a mismatch in the expectations and understanding of the role and nature of research on the one hand of the Oslo researchers and on the other of the staff appointed to lead the country and regional teams. Thus while Oslo research plans focussed almost entirely on the collection of data and comparative regional studies undertaken by the 12 Masters projects, national leaders wanted more focussed practical projects to be undertaken.
123. **Failure of Partners to complete decisions made at meetings** The minutes of RPSC meetings indicate many good decisions and promises that were made but were subsequently either not carried out or unduly delayed.
124. At the November 2002 RPSC meeting in Nairobi, the University of Oslo agreed to draft a concept paper on guidelines for the research and training component. It was agreed that countries would set up mechanisms for technical advisory support. It was noted as an amendment to the Prodoc that a contracting MOU would be drawn up between the University of Oslo and UNOPS. This MOU would elaborate each unit’s role in the use of the NORAD funds. Countries agreed to prepare a logframe and SWOT analysis for each site. The University proposed a field mission to all 3 countries (one week per country). It was agreed that this would take place in April 2003.
125. In fact little appears to have happened in 2003, other than the appointment of staff in the regional and national offices. The contract with NORAD was not signed until December 2003.
126. At the January 2004 RPSC meeting:
 - Dr Oba presented some preliminary guidelines for research and training.
 - Data collection was identified as a RPSC priority
 - The need for monitoring the impact of GEF projects was discussed and it was agreed that UNEP would meet with the RCU to discuss the integration of impact indicators into the national log frames.

- The University of Oslo explained that the trip to the countries had not taken place for cost reasons, but that it would be reconsidered now that NORAD funding had been secured.
- The RPSC resolved to postpone setting up the technical advisory committee pending the operationalization of the research and training component.
- It was agreed that a contract was now required between Oslo and UNOPS/UNEP for the training and research component of the IVP, and that this should be completed by the end of March 2004.

127. There was an excessive delay in completing the contract. A draft was sent to Oslo in January 2004, but there was no constructive response at all until a half page response was received by UNOPS late in April, and the contract was not signed until June 28th, when it was signed as a matter of urgency in order to enable the students to enroll for their masters courses.

128. The contract required

1. A proposal for comparative research (the research plan) to be prepared within 4 weeks. This task was delegated to Dr Oba, who was in Kenya at the time. As a result the first draft plan did not appear for approximately 3 months. Over the next four months at least four drafts were written, resulting in a presentation to the RPSC in February 2005.
2. A three monthly report. This was not delivered on time in 2004.
3. Visits to be made to all 3 countries “shortly following acceptance of its proposal” (the Research Plan). Visits were made to Botswana between 10 and 28 January 2005 and Kenya between 28 January and 25 February 2005.
4. Oslo to “provide technical backstopping to the national projects and support research of local import through information sharing and effective assistance to local research institutions that collaborate with these national projects. However it did not require Oslo to implement targeted (site-specific) research. Dr Oba provided some assistance during his visit to Kenya and Botswana.
5. Oslo to propose and implement regional comparative studies, including the implementation of a biodiversity inventory. The contract did not require Oslo to propose and implement site-specific research but did make it the sole contact for UNOPS on all matters related to targeted research and training, thereby giving Oslo effective financial control of the site-specific research.

Findings Categorized under Research Outcomes

129. As the project document and the research plan were muddled and do not clearly define the different types and purposes of research, we have done the following categorization and have organized our findings accordingly. From the project document we identified three components, based on the main purpose of the research, as follows.

Fulfillment of degree requirements as part of the Masters program

130. This refers to for the 12 project-funded MSc students. There were unacceptable delays in completing the contractual agreement with Oslo (it was not signed until mid 2004, just before the MSc course started). This ruled out any possibility of a PhD, and meant that the Mali students had no opportunity for significant language training.
131. The Masters program started late but is now operational. Most students have completed their field research proposals. The proposals were generally of acceptable standard, using appropriate methods. In general the projects involve a questionnaire, and some include transect studies.
132. These proposals were generally appropriate studies related to community-based range management (CBRM). There was an appropriate overlap between the research proposals, that should enable comparative studies. However none propose to undertake comparative studies between the 3 countries as a part of the research. The proposals may overlap with some country research priorities for site-specific research, as listed in the Research Plan. Only some of the student proposals had been circulated to the RPSC members for comment. It is not surprising that the studies are therefore not regarded as a main research component by the IVP teams.
133. We noted that the MSc student fieldwork was due to start shortly after the field work of the MTR, but that there was little communication about the need for support and supervision in the field from the IVP country teams. We understand the country teams will provide some logistical assistance. The students should complete the write-up of their theses by June 2006. These theses should become available to the IVP country teams at that time.
134. **Communication with students** There have been some minor communication problems between the Noragric administrators and teachers, and the students, but in general we did not find these to be serious. However, we were concerned at the reluctance of the University of Oslo and its sub-contractors to make adjustments to the projects when it became apparent that there was a security risk to two of the students who planned to do their fieldwork in the Hurri Hills in Kenya near the Ethiopian border. Ethnic violence erupted here in July 2005. UNEP/UNDP informed Oslo in late August that the Hurri Hills had been classified by the UN as a Security Category 4 and that UN project funds could not be used to send students to the area. When the Evaluation Team met with these students on September 23rd, they still had not been informed of this – a week before they were scheduled to start their fieldwork there. NorAgric's solution was to ask the UNDP Regional Coordinator if UNDP could prevent the students from going there as citizens of Kenya on leave from their studies, returning to their homes. As of Sept 25, we were advised that this is the strategy that Oslo/Noragric intended to pursue. We consider the students concerned to be at risk, if they proceed with their original plans, particularly as they are locals in the areas concerned. We also understand that the project is unable to provide adequate security cover. It is therefore unacceptable that the students were not immediately directed to adjust their research studies to alternative sites, even as a back-up plan should the security risk remain. We understand that the students are still being allowed by Oslo/Noragric to undertake their studies in the high-risk areas only because they are not directly funded by the UN, and so the UN is unable to stop them.
135. **Language problems** At least some of the francophone students from Mali joined the MSc program with essentially no English capability. They were given only four weeks English training. Most universities consider three months language training to be an absolute

minimum, or require a minimum standard in English as a basic entry requirement. As a result the Mali students could not understand much of their first semester's work. We concluded that there had been insufficient recognition of the needs for English language training, and that inadequate language training was provided. We noted that Oslo had arranged a four-week emergency language training program but we found this to be quite inadequate. The problem should have been recognized and addressed before the students arrived in Norway, especially since UNOPS had identified the problem in January 2004.

Indigenous knowledge (IK), environmental assessment and ecological monitoring data collection and preservation

136. This includes research that is to be undertaken within each country to develop a regional arid zone database on vegetation, including management practices, that can be used for comparative research and modeling (Research Plan section 3). Oslo claims that this information also may have an immediate practical use in that the existence of specific types of vegetation can provide valuable clues to appropriate management methods. In the medium term it can also assist the community in on-going range management decision-making. In order to achieve the project objective and outcomes, data collection is required for several reasons:

1. To assist with development of CBRM systems
2. To capture and record Indigenous knowledge (IK)
3. To provide short and medium-term management decisions
4. To facilitate development of the regional arid zone database
5. For comparative regional research and modeling
6. In addition, as this is a GEF funded project, the project must meet GEF ecological impact assessment requirements.

(a) Indigenous Knowledge of traditional range management systems/techniques

137. All the Masters student projects we reviewed involved interviews with people from the local community in the field. This should provide a base for recording IK, although it is important that a standardized approach is taken.

138. The MTR found that Intellectual Property issues had not been addressed. There are many instances where local knowledge has been used by international conglomerates to identify and patent extracts from natural products, without benefit to the community. While this is nothing new, in today's world this is an area of increasing concern amongst communities and governments, who feel that the local communities should benefit from the exploitation of their knowledge. IK ownership should therefore be considered and safeguarded in this project.

(b) Ecological Monitoring

139. The first baseline measures for ecological monitoring have only been done in the last three months. No measures were made during the first three years.

140. Training for taking measurements along transects for ecological monitoring was provided in May of 2005. Three people each from Mali and Botswana, and 6 from Kenya were trained. Transects were set up in Botswana (where they were located directly by Dr. Oba) and Kenya. We found that concerns about the locations of the transects in Botswana were reasonable. At the Turkana site in Kenya all the transects have been located in rather dense riverine forest, rather than in the extensive dry rangelands. The siting of the transects was done by the IVP National Liaison Officer for Kenya following the training. In Mali we were advised at the

MTR meeting that the IVP country team was arranging for the trainees to set up transects themselves.

141. We found no indication of planning for GEF ecological impact monitoring requirements. We also found that the reasons for collecting data were not well understood.

Site-Specific Research (targeted research)

142. This is research done to assist communities and IVP field teams to make good management decisions, and includes short-term applied research and knowledge transfer. Such research could be largely in the form of literature reviews or examination of other projects to identify lessons learned and best practices, coupled with effective communication of results to communities, but could also include site-specific experimental trials. National and regional project leaders indicated the need for this type of applied research and technology transfer (extension). We will refer to this type of research as Site-Specific Research, since the term Targeted Research is a confusing term without clear definition.
143. At the time of the MTR, site-specific research for the development of range management systems had not yet started. Under the existing contract, Oslo is responsible for driving this component. However we found there had been a complete lack of leadership in this area on the part of Oslo. Despite the desire from the IVP country teams to move forward quickly on site-specific research, there was no evidence of research activity, or of research support directly to communities. It is especially important to document the impacts of the limited number of project interventions that have affected range condition.

Impact of Project Interventions

144. During the visit by the MTR team leader to the field sites, he found evidence of some project interventions involving changes to range condition resulting from the restoration of traditional management techniques (Kenya) or other interventions, e.g. fenced enclosures in Mali. None of these had been monitored and quantified. In the context of the project, and in view of the GEF requirements, an evaluation of the impact of these interventions could have formed the basis of a site-specific research study.

Weaknesses in Regional Support for Research

145. We also found that a gap was created at regional level when the Regional Technical Expert position of the RCU was not filled. No one, including the Regional Coordinator, Oslo, and the IVP country team leaders, has covered this gap. The Technical Advisory Committee foreseen in the ProDoc was not set up. The Regional Coordinator has no responsibilities in his TOR for serving as a technical advisor. This has left Oslo alone to define and to develop the research program, including the site-specific research. Hence no technical support on range management or research support was forthcoming for country teams or communities. We found that no effective attempt was made to fill the gap, either by rewriting the job description of the Regional Coordinator, or by expanding Oslo's responsibilities to include significant technical leadership in the field (as distinct from financial control).
146. We concluded that the non-appointment of the Regional Technical Expert and the failure to create a regional Technical Advisory Committee left a gap. Under its contract Oslo was required to provide technical advice and to support research of local import, but it was not required to initiate or drive site-specific studies. However it still retained financial control and

management of all the research activities. The TORs for the Regional Coordinator also did not include technical leadership. This arrangement did not work.

147. The situation deteriorated until late the RPSC meeting in February 2005, decided that the site-specific (targeted) research component would be entrusted to national institutions and that the contract between Oslo and UNOPS should be amended accordingly. UNOPS prepared a contract revision in April 2005. There followed a number of misunderstandings and debates about the wording and budget in the revised contract. In the meantime the Regional Coordination Unit invited selected national universities to develop research proposals, with a budget of US\$80,000 - 100,000 per country. At a meeting held in Kenya in May, Oslo challenged the right of the Regional Coordination Unit to take this action, as the revised contract had not been signed, and therefore the June 2004 contract remained in force. This argument effectively stalled the proposals by several months, and up to the MTR there had been no resolution of the problem. This delay was unacceptable. After the MTR presentation in Kenya, an agreement on the budget and management of the site-specific research component was reached. Shortly after this, a revised contract was sent by UNOPS to Oslo. Oslo acknowledged receipt and informed UNOPS that they would take the revised proposal under consideration, but did not sign the contract until a further four weeks had elapsed.
148. National Technical Committees have been set up in all three countries. At the time of the MTR, the site-specific research proposals had been received but had not been reviewed by Oslo, but had been considered and approved by National Technical Committees in Botswana and Mali. With the exception of the Egerton proposals, we found the proposals were of acceptable quality and on pertinent topics. Egerton's proposals remain in the form of Master's project outlines as they had halted work on them pending the resolution of the conflict over institutional mandates. It is now too late for Egerton to do the research through their MSc program, but we were advised at the MTR meeting in Kenya that they may still be able to undertake at least part of the research through other mechanisms.

Organization of Research

149. No one took responsibility for leadership of the site-based research component. The contract with the University of Oslo gave them control of the finances, but not the responsibility to lead the site-based research. The RC states that, although it was not specified in the UNOPS/Oslo contract, it was always the understanding that Oslo would subcontract to site-specific research to local institutions.
150. The project was hampered from the start by administrative and procedural delays. In particular the delays in signing the original and revised contracts between Oslo and UNOPS were unacceptable. On both occasions Oslo was extremely slow in responding to draft contracts.
151. The delay in providing the research plan as specified in the Oslo contract was also unacceptable.
152. There was a late start generally, and the three countries all began to function at different times. This hampered coordination.

Problems with the Research Plan

153. We found that the Research Plan was not only developed late but it was not of professional quality. The plan is a very difficult document to understand, and some of its content is inaccurate (for example two of the student's research thesis topics are described incorrectly). The document describes four themes, and then argues that the students' theses are aligned with these themes. It then develops theme 2, but says nothing about the other 3 themes. Later it suddenly refers to themes 5 and 6, which are clearly technology transfer/information sharing exercises, but they seem not to have been mentioned beforehand. The document does describe some aspects of the transect measurements for ecological monitoring very briefly, but it is not as comprehensive as the Botswana version.
154. The plan also mentions a 3-month consultancy to complement the regional research, but it is not clear who will do this, or when this will occur. It states that the funding will come from UNOPS.
155. The protocols for the research transects are listed fully only in the Botswana document. No reasons are given to justify the placement of the transects, other than to say some are set out radially from bore holes. It is difficult to see how the transect data between the 3 countries can be compared if the protocols differ. If they are meant to be identical they should have been included in the research plan.
156. The reports on the visits by Dr Gufu to the two countries give considerable detail about the situations, and they are well written and quite detailed.
157. The MTR Team received different versions of the research plan from the regional office and from Oslo. The Oslo version was 50% longer and had more detail on the research protocols (and is outlined above). It is not clear from the document when this was written, but Dr Oba indicated that it was completed in February 2005 shortly after his visit, although the regional office indicated that they had not received the revised version.
158. The plan is entitled the regional research plan. However it also lists national priorities, and (national?) targeted research components in appendices. It lists these first under themes, but the themes do not always correspond exactly to the themes listed previously. For example theme 3 (p7) is supposed to be Rehabilitation, but the description is about monitoring (p8). The targeted research inputs (outlined on p17) are not related to what is described earlier, but are closer to the title of the themes. Later the document lists research priorities for Botswana and Kenya, which differ from the priorities listed earlier in Table 2. Some of the subjects appear to come from the minutes of the January 2004 meeting of the RPCS, but it is not clear how these were arrived at.
159. The Botswana mission report lists the GPS coordinates of the transects. The Kenya Mission report does not have this data.
160. There is no mission report on the Mali situation, and hence no information about country priorities, in the research design. There are however 2 paragraphs on Mali in the Research plan (p3).
161. Appendix D also lists our concerns.

Insufficient information on Regional Database

162. Data gathered from the transect studies and the masters programs could provide data for the regional database. However, as the objectives and uses of the regional database remain, undefined, it is impossible for the MTR to judge their adequacy. Also, details on collection, recording, analysis and storage are not spelt out adequately in the research plan.

The scientific leadership provided by the University of Oslo

163. The terms of reference for the MTR specifically require the following;

“Assess the quality, appropriateness and timeliness of the scientific leadership being provided by the University of Oslo in the implementation of the regional training and comparative learning and targeted research components of the project that it is coordinating... In particular activities related to the establishment of the regional arid zone bio-database”

164. **General** We have already identified a number of problems in relation to communication and leadership of research above, which we will summarise here.
165. The Oslo – UNOPS contract specifies that Oslo will be the sole contact point for the contract in all matters related to the targeted research and training component, and gives Oslo the right to sub-contract components subject to UNOPS approval. We found this arrangement was working satisfactorily in the case of the 12 Masters students’ research projects. However we also found problems with other components.
166. The contract gave Oslo financial control of all research money but not leadership of the site-specific component. In 2005 Oslo prevented the site-specific research proposals from being implemented, by refusing to assist to carry out the decision of the February RPSC meeting until their contract had been altered and signed.
167. Oslo has led the Masters training program reasonably well. There have been some minor problems in communication with the students, and this increased while the students were in Egerton. We are concerned that the students may not receive adequate supervision during their fieldwork.
168. We found that the amount of time Oslo team leaders had spent in Africa was low, given the need for their coordinating role. The UNEP contract with Oslo requires 1.4 man-months (MM) for the coordinator (2 trips, 21 days each), and 4.5 MM for the specialist (3 trips, 42 days each). The actual time spent in country was below this (excluding regional meetings, the total time so far is 8 days for the coordinator, and 44 days for the specialist. We found that the continued non-presence of Oslo researchers in Mali was unacceptable.
169. While Oslo was not the only contributor to the communication problem, it certainly played a significant part. Oslo has made arrangements to deal with their side of the problem, and the situation began to improve in 2005, although the contractual problems masked the improvement.
170. The research plan was poor.

Conclusions, Ratings and Lessons Learned

Conclusions and Ratings

171. **Relevance of the Project Objective** The MTR Team considers the Project Objective to remain Highly Relevant. The weaknesses of project design and of project implementation in no way detract from the high level of importance that should be accorded to the Project Objective.

General progress towards Project Objective and Outcomes:

172. **Project Objective** Overall progress towards achievement of the Project Objective – Moderately Unsatisfactory.

Progress towards the six Outcomes are as follows:

173. **O-1 & O-3** Overall progress towards achievement of Outcomes 1 (establishment of appropriate indigenous management systems) and O-3 (rehabilitation of indigenous vegetation) is Moderately unsatisfactory.
174. **O-2 Regional Database** Progress is clearly Unsatisfactory. Even the purpose of the database remains undefined. (see details under ratings for Oslo below)
175. **O-4 alternative livelihoods** Progress towards the achievement of and improvement of alternative livelihoods, livestock marketing and fodder resources is Moderately Satisfactory.
- Alternative livelihoods has become a major focus of the project. There level of community participation is Satisfactory.
 - The quality of the livelihood interventions is mixed, but is generally Satisfactory.
 - The alternative livelihoods activities have been generally well-appreciated by local communities – although there have definitely been cases of frustrations and accusations of promises made that were unfulfilled.
 - The strategic linkage between alternative livelihoods and the Project Objective is weak and is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.
176. **O-5 Technology transfer, training and regional comparative learning** Progress has been Moderately Satisfactory.
- Technology transfer has been Moderately Satisfactory but the linkage to the Project Objective, as in the design, has often been weak.
 - Training of the MSc students is Satisfactory – see details under ratings for Oslo
 - Training of communities is Moderately Unsatisfactory.
 - Training for skills needed for alternative livelihoods is Satisfactory
 - Training in the skills needed for community-based management of rangelands is Unsatisfactory. This essential type of training is not clearly defined in the logframe.
 - Progress on regional comparative learning is Unsatisfactory. There have been little or no results to disseminate
177. **Ranking of Oslo's performance on research** MTR's tentative ratings for Oslo's performance are as follows:

178. ***Regional Training of 12 MSc students***

- Quality –Satisfactory (although Oslo used good resources, only old books were available at Egerton).
- Appropriateness – Moderately Satisfactory (No courses on range management)
- Timeliness - Moderately Satisfactory (should have been organized to give Mali students time for language training).

179. ***Establishment of the regional arid zone bio-database***

- **Appropriateness** – Unsatisfactory. There is inadequate documentation defining objectives, purpose and methodologies for how the database will be used.
- **Quality** – Moderately Unsatisfactory There are no clear protocols given for the data gathering exercise.
- **Timing** – Unsatisfactory (Starting only now, three years into project)

180. ***Site-specific research***

- Unsatisfactory on all counts. Oslo did not provide technical advice, nor did they facilitate the proposed research in 2005 by fast-tracking the revised contract.

181. **Ability to follow GEF BD2 Guidelines** These guidelines were only made known to the project at the RPSC meeting in February 2005. The integration of Project activities into the programs of various government technical services in the field has been Satisfactory – it has enjoyed good support from local authorities. However, the involvement of government services and other actors has primarily been focused around alternative livelihoods and has not focused on the development of community-based range management systems. The Range Ecology section of the Ministry of Agriculture in Botswana was deeply involved in the development of the participatory range monitoring system based on indigenous knowledge – this system is supposed to become a significant tool of the management systems to be developed. There has been little private sector involvement in project activities to date (Kenya/Turkana is an exception), but there is good potential for innovative partnerships between community managers and private sector businesses. CBRM should itself be viewed as a productive sector initiative. Mainstreaming of CBRM into government policies and programs presents a major challenge given the small amount of time remaining. See the recommendations section on this. Rating of measures already taken to conform to BD2 Guidelines: Moderately Unsatisfactory. Potential for conforming to BD2 Guidelines in the time remaining: Moderately Satisfactory.

182. **The cost effectiveness** of the project towards achievement of the Project Objective at this point in time is Unsatisfactory. Given that progress towards achievement of the PO is so poor, it would make no sense to give a higher rating.

183. **The potential impacts** on biodiversity conservation and rangeland rehabilitation at this point are minimal. The most positive single potential impact is the effect of the deferred grazing at Kaitese at Turkana site in northwestern Kenya. If continued for a couple more years, this intervention will have had a dramatic impact on the rehabilitation of this site. In the absence of any baseline or monitoring system at this site, nothing can be said about its impact on biodiversity. Kaitese provides the most promising single example of the potential

of community-based range management. The fencing off of 400 ha blocks for rainfed agriculture in Botswana may actually be causing some increase in the loss of natural ecosystem biodiversity through conversion/ clearing. The socio-economic impacts of the alternative livelihood activities of the project are largely undocumented. Rating: Unsatisfactory

184. **Sustainability** At this point in time, there are no community-based range management systems to sustain – they have not yet been developed. The partnerships and positive working relationships with government technical services and local authorities are positive aspects that can be built upon to sustain CBRM systems still to be developed. The range monitoring system developed by Oslo/Noragric has been integrated in ongoing monitoring systems in Range Ecology in Botswana. No commitments of ongoing funding for follow-on support for CBRM have been identified in any country. Another key hurdle involves policy/legal/regulatory reforms to sustain CBRM. Although the general policy environment is supportive in Mali and Kenya, the clear definition of legal tools for CBRM remains a challenge in all countries. It presents an especially difficult challenge in Botswana. Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
185. **Benefits from ongoing and past research and operational activities** of the scientific community, GEF, UNEP, UNDP and the University of Oslo. The MTR has not seen any benefits from any of these sources. It was the MTR Team Leader who made the IVP actors aware of the relevant CBRM experiences and innovative practices being developed by the UNEP/UNDP/ GEF Senegal-Mauritania Biodiversity Project and of the UNDP/GEF Integrated Ecosystem Management Project in Senegal. The MTR team is unaware of any recommendations from Oslo/Noragric on how to develop community-based range management systems or on specific techniques that would be appropriate for specific sites. Rating: Unsatisfactory
186. **Timeliness, usefulness and relevance of the technologies generated** for reversing land degradation & for management of indigenous vegetation – Unsatisfactory. The only successful and replicable technologies tested to date are traditional technologies tested in Kenya. Exlosures tested in Mali are not replicable.
187. **Mobilization of indigenous knowledge** for the management of indigenous vegetation – Almost none of this has been done by Oslo yet, but the MSc students were just leaving for the field towards the end of the MTR field work. Some initiatives for capturing indigenous knowledge had been taken by country teams – Kenya in particular. Integration of IK into management systems has not taken place. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory.
188. **The marriage of indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge** and practical experience for CBRM. At this point, almost none of this has been done. Rating: Unsatisfactory.
189. **Community mobilization for alternative livelihoods** – The project has enjoyed some remarkable successes in mobilizing and organizing communities to implement initiatives that the communities themselves have identified. In Mali, communities that were initially skeptical are now much more open to participating in project supported activities. Communities in all countries provide their labor and local materials for alternative livelihoods. The effort invested by communities in the construction of drift fences is impressive. Rating: Satisfactory

190. **Involvement of rural populations in the development of management systems** – Marginally Unsatisfactory. In Kenya, it is local communities that took the initiative to ask IVP to help them reinvigorate their traditional technique of deferred grazing. In Mali and Botswana, no evidence of community involvement in the development of range management systems was seen (although there was clear evidence in Botswana that communities strongly wish to manage “their” rangelands).
191. **Effectiveness of UNEP & UNDP & UNOPS oversight** to maintain project focus on Project Objective and effectiveness of project structures to resolve major problems – Marginally Unsatisfactory
192. **Effectiveness of delivery of technical expertise** The ProDoc called for two professional level positions at the RCU, a Regional Coordinator and a Regional Technical Advisor. The RTA post was not filled for budgetary reasons. The RC’s TOR were not modified to include a technical advisory function – the definition of the TOR for the RC would seem to be primarily UNEP’s responsibility. The RCU has no formal role in providing technical support to the country teams and the pilot sites. The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was not created (advice (the MTR does not think this would have been a cost effective mechanism for provide technical expertise to the country teams). Oslo has not played a technical advisory role – they have scarcely been present at the field sites. The effectiveness of the delivery of technical expertise needed by the field teams and the pilot communities is rated as Unsatisfactory.
193. **The Need for range management & CBNRM expertise** is High. The main need is for people who can translate indigenous knowledge, scientific knowledge and other relevant experience into practical, functional range/vegetation management options.
194. **Country Ownership** The project was designed by UNEP working with the three governments and with a national consultant in each country. Governments were clearly involved in project development, but they also did not have a full understanding of some key aspects of project design. None of the three governments understood that CBRM can only be done if the target communities are empowered to control access and to manage their resources. Mali had no understanding of why Oslo was brought in as an executing agency for the research component. None of the countries understood why UNDP was brought in at the end as a co-implementing agency with UNEP.
195. The empowerment of communities for range/resource management is in general agreement with the policy frameworks for Mali and Kenya and government representatives at all levels are generally supportive of the need to empower the pilot communities in those two countries. This is not the case in Botswana where the legal and policy framework is not supportive of community empowerment and where the IVP National Coordinator representing government has expressed his desire that IVP should develop a “technical model” for range management without empowerment of the pilot communities. To the MTR Team, a theoretical model developed on paper that is not tested in the field in the real life context of an empowered community management institution would serve little purpose.
196. The MTR considers the Project Objective to be highly relevant for the national development and environmental agendas of all three countries. It is also relevant to their regional and international agreements.

197. **Implementation Approach** The implementation mechanisms have not been effective in keeping the project focused on the Project Objective. They have not been effective in resolving one of the biggest problems faced by the project – the lack of any progress on site-based research. The RPSC is the highest level decision making body on the project. The RPSC decided in early March that targeted research should be done through national institutions and instructed UNEP and UNOPS to make the necessary changes in the UNOPS contract with Oslo. This contract amendment was only completed in October, four weeks after an intervention by the MTR team. The main constraint seems to be the interminable delays on the part of Oslo and the unwillingness of UNEP/UNDP and UNOPS to potentially offend the donor NORAD by taking appropriate action against Oslo for their lack of performance. UNEP, UNDP and UNOPS have kept NORAD informed and have held meetings with NORAD, but this has not lead to a resolution of the problems. UNEP, UNDP and UNOPS are working quite well together. None of them have a good working relationship with Oslo.
198. The Regional Coordination Unit spends much of its time also trying to coordinate with Oslo – but without any decision-making authority. The RCU does not play a badly needed technical advisory role. It attempts to play a coordination role with the other major regional component – the Oslo research component. The RCU has been no more successful in establishing a healthy working relationship with Oslo than anyone else.
199. **Replicability** At this point in time, the project has almost nothing to replicate in terms of community-based range management systems. The deferred grazing technique developed at Kaitese is definitely a technique to be further developed and to be integrated into management systems. If the project does succeed in developing CBRM systems by the end of the project, then they will also need to pay great attention on measures needed to mainstream and replicate/adapt the systems developed – see Recommendations. Rating: Unsatisfactory
200. **Monitoring and evaluation** As the project objective is to develop models for biodiversity conservation and restoration of degraded rangelands, it is critical to monitor these two factors. This requires that appropriate indicators and baseline values must be established at the beginning of the project. The development of an ecological monitoring system is the responsibility of Oslo. The first RPSC meeting was held in November 2002 at the start-up of the project. The ecological monitoring system and the first ecological monitoring transects were not established until the beginning of 2005 in Botswana. Kenya has since been done and the baseline was still being established in Mali at the time of the evaluation. Even so, the available documentation on this monitoring system did not allow the research evaluator to determine its adequacy. Ecological monitoring on the project has been Unsatisfactory.
201. **APR and internal monitoring** The principal M&E tool for the project is the Annual Project Review (APR). The MTR team leader obtained an early draft of the 2005 APR that had just been prepared by UNEP while the MTR was underway but before UNEP had been briefed on the preliminary results of the MTR. Most of the ratings were Satisfactory with a lesser number of Moderately Unsatisfactory ratings. Only targeted research was rated Unsatisfactory. When compared with the ratings given by the MTRA, this is a strong indication has the APR has not been an effective M&E tool for the project. The RC reports that the project lacks an effective internal M&E system. The overall ranking for M&E on the project is Unsatisfactory.

202. **Financial management and planning** In general, the financial management of the project seems to be working fairly well. There was clearly a problem in early 2004, as UNDP and UNOPS were switching over to the new Atlas financial accounting software. The problems were especially acute in Botswana. Another problem with financial planning is the fact that the total budget for the three country programs was divided equally among the three countries without regard to relative costs in each country. Botswana is the highest cost country and Botswana is now in the most financially constrained – they may not have enough funds to reach the targeted project completion date of June 2007. The overall ranking of financial management is Satisfactory.
203. **Appropriateness of the logical framework** This has already been analyzed in detail in the chapter on Project Design.
204. **Strategic role of alternative livelihoods/ micro-projects** The ProDoc gives little strategic guidance as to what type of alternatives livelihoods should be developed or how they are to be linked with the Project Objective. The logframe does call for improved market outlets for range-based products but the written description in the body of the ProDoc is less specific. The IVP field teams see micro-projects primarily as a “buy-in” to gain community support – or even as an end in themselves. The Regional Coordinator’s perspective is that alternative livelihoods are necessary rural development alternatives for populations who are outgrowing the ability of their resource base to sustain them. Alternative livelihoods have grown to become the main project focus. These activities are highly demanding for a wide range of expertise/resources.
205. Alternative livelihoods can potentially have perverse impacts. Pastoralists who benefit from increased revenues commonly invest in more livestock – in the absence of range management systems, that would only increase overgrazing. At this point, all of the alternative livelihood activities developed by IVP have been done in the absence of range management systems. Furthermore, the alternative livelihood activities have not even been focussed on the pilot communities for CBRM development. In most cases, IVP field teams have not yet selected the specific communities that they will work with on CBRM system development. The alternative livelihoods interventions have been characterized by a lack of strategic thinking and strategic linkages with the Project Objective.
206. **Timeliness, usefulness and relevance of the technologies generated** for reversing land degradation & for management of indigenous vegetation. The successful techniques tested by the project are mostly unsuitable for replication or scaling up because they are not economically viable. This includes the fenced exclosures in Mali and the intensive rehabilitation using fences and very high labor intensive half-moon water catchments. The deferred grazing scheme at Katese is the one relevant technology that can be replicated and integrated into grazing systems. On the other hand, one can’t really say that the project has “generated” any new technologies. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned related to Project Design:

207. When developing projects for the sustainable management of natural resources, it is critical to involve people with experience in natural resource management in project

development. It is important to recognize that there are relatively few examples of sustainable management of natural resources in most African countries. Most of the civil servants working in the NR sectors have experience with natural resource administration and/or in enforcement of NR laws, but relatively few have experience in operational NR management systems.

208. When developing projects for community-based management of natural resources, it is very important to involve people with direct experience in working with CBNRM in the development of these projects. There is an emerging body of lessons learned, principles and best practices on CBNRM. These need to be captured and integrated into project design. The most critical condition that must be fulfilled before one can begin to develop a CB management system is to have a representative community management authority that is empowered to control access to the resource that they are to manage. Government commitment to empowering communities should be very clearly defined and documented in the ProDoc.
209. It is critical that the internal logic of the project be very clearly spelled out in the project document. It is critical that the strategic linkages between outcomes and objectives be made very clear. Those implementing or supervising a project are frequently completely different people from those who developed the project. The ProDoc needs to be a self-explanatory, stand-alone document.
210. When designing a project that is to tackle one of the most difficult challenges in natural resource management, it is critical to focus the outcomes and the outputs on that which is the most difficult if one wishes the project to succeed. The IVP logframe is full of elements whose strategic linkage to the project objective are not clear at all and full of elements that are of marginal importance in relation to the project objective.

Lessons Learned Related to Project Implementation

211. When implementing a project that is tackling one of the most difficult challenges in the natural resource arena, one needs to ensure that one brings to bear some of the best expertise available. For the development of community-based range/vegetation management systems, the field teams recruited or appointed should include some of the best range managers available in country and should include people with CBNRM field experience, if such people exist in country. The RCU on the IVP project should have played primarily a technical support role and secondarily a coordination role. Long term staff should be supplemented with short-term specialists as needed. What is really needed is people with field management experience. Researchers are specialized in doing research. It is only exceptionally that you find researchers that can serve as effective technical advisors for the development of resource management systems.
212. All of the GEF implementation agencies need to develop more effective methods of capitalizing on lessons learned and best practices from other GEF-funded projects. None of the IVP country field teams or RCU staff were aware of the recent, relevant experiences from the UNDP/UNEP/GEF Senegal Mauritania Biodiversity Project or of the UNDP/GEF Integrated Ecosystem Management Project in Senegal. Both of these projects are also developing community-based range management systems – and appear to be on the “cutting edge” of the development of such systems in Africa.

213. Communication protocols and documentation systems need to be established at the beginning of a project.
214. The MTR should be completed by the time the half way point is reached, so should start about 3 – 5 months before the mid point. In this project despite the requests for an early MTR, it will not be completed until the project is almost two-thirds completed.

Recommendations

Strategic Restructuring of the Project

215. If the project were to continue on the same course that it was on at the time of the MTR, it would almost certainly not achieve its objective. Based on the findings and the rankings of progress made and performance, it would be quite easy to recommend that the project be simply shut down.
216. **Drastic restructuring and refocusing of the Project:** The MTR considered the option of recommending that IVP be shut down but decided against it for several reasons. The IVP country teams have developed positive working relationships with local communities on their field sites. They enjoy generally good support from local authorities and are well integrated with government technical services. Communities in Botswana have a clear and strong desire to control and to manage their resources. Communities in Kenya have requested the help of IVP to reinvigorate the traditional range management systems that they have come close to losing and are open to building upon and to going beyond the traditional. Communities in Mali have shown an exceptional capacity for mobilization for collective action when they see it to be for the common good of the community.
217. To still achieve the project objective, IVP would need to be drastically restructured and refocused. Can this be done? For this, the MTR Team Leader draws inspiration from the Senegal/Mauritania Biodiversity project. It is also a community-based range and vegetation management project that was poorly designed. During the first two years, it strayed far away from its intended objective, treating the symptoms of overgrazing in small fenced plots on about 120 sites that were financially unviable and therefore unreplicable. The Team Leader worked with this project to restructure and refocus it. The number of sites was reduced from 120 to 16 sites (generally of over 10,000 has each), work on fenced plots was discontinued and community management groups began testing range management techniques over large areas without the use of fences – all within three months.
218. So the MTR does not recommend shutting down the project. The MTR recommends that IVP undertake a drastic restructuring and that IVP be strongly refocused on the core Project Objective and on those Outcomes, Outputs and Activities that are truly essential for achieving the project objective.
219. **Simplified Formulation of Project Objective** The MTR recommends that the following simplified reformulation of the Project Objective be adopted.

Degraded lands are restored and biodiversity is conserved through the development of community-based range management systems.

220. **Highest Level Priority Recommendations:**
1. IVP should have a minimum of two functional community-based range/vegetation management systems in each country by the End of Project (EOP)
 2. These functional CBRM systems in each country should be based on:
 - A representative, legally registered, community management institution
 - Agreed access rights to the lands/resources managed by each community structure;
 - Legal document conferring management rights and obligations to the community management structure.
 3. Nationally driven, site-based, short-term research in support of CBRM with research results transferred to communities and IVP field teams. Proposed criteria for such research is presented in Appendix B;
 4. Sound ecological monitoring systems in place with institutional arrangement to ensure their continuation over the mid to long term;
 5. Mainstreaming of CBRM into government programs/policies/laws and into community/government/private sector/civil society partnerships
221. **Focus on Project Objective** Most critically, the Project needs to focus on the Project Objective -- on the development of community-based range/vegetation management systems at a few pilot sites. These sites should be selected to be ecologically, socially and economically representative and should have other characteristics that will give them an optimal chance of success. A draft set of criteria for selecting pilot communities is presented in Appendix A. The MTR recommends that each country should set the objective of having a minimum of two functioning CBRM systems by EOP. This also means that each country should probably be working with more than two pilot communities – assuming that not every pilot community will succeed. Each country team may want to work with three or four pilot communities in order to end up with at least two “success stories” by EOP. IVP’s success or failure in developing community-based range/vegetation management systems should be the main criteria of the final evaluation for judging the success or failure of the IVP Project. Governments should put in place mechanisms for continued support for the two pilot management systems beyond the end of project.
222. **Role of the RCU** The RCU should play key strategic and technical roles in project restructuring. The Regional Coordinator should work with each country team to review their work programs, staffing levels, number of sites, etc., in light of the MTR recommendations. All Activities should be reviewed in terms of their contribution towards the project objective – and should be retained, modified or dropped accordingly. The proposed technical role for the RC is defined in Other Recommendations below.
223. **Phasing out** Sites and activities that don’t contribute to the Project Objective should be dropped or phased out as rapidly as possible. In particular, alternative livelihoods should be phased out as rapidly as possible. The only new alternative livelihood interventions should be range product-based businesses based on managed rangelands in pilot communities where range management systems are being developed.
224. **The GIS and mapping** should now be focused on the specific pilot communities to develop cost effective techniques to provide the specific types of information needed for the development of management systems. Work on improved livestock management systems, improved livestock production and non-range fodder production should be discontinued. Work on alternative technologies (destined for reducing pressures or resources) should be phased out. Research should concentrate on filling information gaps in the information needed for effective range management.

225. **Review personnel and sites** Personnel needs should be reviewed and staff reductions or changes made as appropriate. The existing sites should be reviewed in each country to determine if some should be dropped. The Hurri Hills in Kenya would certainly be a prime candidate to be dropped because of the severe security problems there.
226. **Follow-on support beyond EOP** will be critical for the survival and development of the young community management groups. Between now and EOP, IVP needs to identify the mix of government and civil society institutions who are best positioned to provide follow-on support. IVP should seek to build the capacities of these groups to provide the different kinds of support that will be needed.
227. **Replicability** In a similar vein, IVP should analyze and identify those government and civil society institutions that are best suited for replicating and adapting the CBRM model systems. IVP should develop a strategy for building capacity to replicate/adapt the model systems to other communities in communal areas.
228. **Risk analysis** The risk analysis for the project needs to be redone. It should include an identification of risks, a ranking of how serious they are and the identification of mitigating measures for each risk identified.
229. **Mobilization of additional funding** Chance of success and sustainability would be greatly enhanced if additional resources can be mobilized to extend IVP beyond mid-2004. The IVP Prodoc called for the mobilization of additional resources, but this has not been done. The MTR recommends that UNEP, UNDP/GEF, UNDP country offices, governments and UNOPS all seek to mobilize additional resource to allow IVP to be extended beyond its present targeted end-of-project completion date.

Country-Specific Recommendations

Country Specific Recommendations: Botswana

230. **Government of Botswana** Government should give immediate priority to identification of appropriate legal instruments for empowerment of the community management structures - the Trusts;
231. Once appropriate legal instruments are identified, the GoB needs to ensure that access rights are legally recognized and that management rights are quickly and efficiently transferred to community managers as soon as the pilot Trusts are created.
232. **Work at pilot sites should focus on:**
- Creation/registration of the Trusts
 - Facilitation of negotiation with neighboring communities of agreed, access rights of each Trust;
 - Complete the detailed mapping of lands/resources of pilot communities;
 - Spatial analysis of sustainability of resource use and root causes of unsustainable uses
 - Identification/analysis of traditional & modern resource management techniques/options
 - Ensuring that management rights are transferred to the communities
 - Development and initial testing of adaptive range/veld management plans/systems

233. **Expertise** IVP Botswana should seek to find and mobilize people with practical, hands-on experience in range/vegetation management to advise the pilot communities on range management. Two prime groups of candidates are the leasehold ranchers and the freehold farmer/ranchers. It is estimated that a small percentage of leasehold ranchers are good land managers. Many of the freehold farmers/ranchers actually live on their farms – there is probably a much higher percentage of good land managers amongst them. IVP should seek out those ranchers who are both amongst the best land managers **and** who are disposed to provide assistance to the young community management authorities and engage them to provide practical technical/management assistance to the community managers.

234. **Potential sources of follow-on funding:**

- Government of Botswana
- UNDP Environmental Support Project
- GEF Small Grants
- UNDP/GEF Sustainable Land Management Medium-Sized Project (under development)

Country Specific Recommendations: Mali

235. **General**

- From now to EOP, concentrate on development of community-based range management systems;
- Proceed quickly to choose the pilot communities for CBRM system development;
- Creation/registration of the community management structures;
- Facilitation validation/negotiation of agreed resource access rights;
- Formal empowerment of the community management institutions.

236. **Work at pilot sites should focus on:**

- Detailed mapping of lands/resources/ water points, etc.
- Spatial analysis of sustainability of resource use and root causes of unsustainable uses
- Identification/analysis and synthesis of traditional & modern resource management techniques/options
- Ensuring that management rights are transferred to the communities
- Development and initial testing of adaptive range management plans/systems for an entire *terroir* or group of *terroir* (Nara)
- Deferred grazing on unvegetated, eroding heavy soils – complemented with direct seeding grasses & trees, small half-moons with direct seeding/planting, branch/termite method for natural regeneration on crusted soils, etc.
- Test the use of dry season rotational grazing of an entire *terroir* (the creation of pasture reserves that were divided into grazing units that were opened in rotation until the end of the dry season was the single most successful technique developed in the first two years of the Senegal/Mauritania Biodiversity Project, enjoying strong support from both sedentary and transhumant herders) in order to spread the use of dry season pasture resources out evenly over the entire dry season.
- Integrate fire prevention/management into grazing plan (corridors, first units grazed serve as firebreaks...)
- Test the technique of leaving approximately 1/3 of grasses at the end of the dry season on degraded sites on heavy soils;
- Integrate transhumants;

- Attempt to include natural forest management on one site within the Nara fuelwood supply zone and develop techniques for individual tree management (selective cutting of branches)
237. Mali has only two dry seasons and one rainy season remaining before end-of-project. If at all possible, IVP Mali should attempt to test a dry season rotational grazing system starting in November at at least one site – if a site can be found where local authorities will support the provisional empowerment of a pilot group.
238. By the rainy season 2006, they should have identified all of their pilot communities and should be testing a range of rainy season range management techniques at each site.
239. Full *terroir* rotational grazing or other techniques should be tested at all pilot sites during the dry season 06-07.
240. **Recommendations for government:**
- Government needs to confirm legal instruments for the empowerment of communities;
 - GoM needs to ensure that management rights are quickly/efficiently transferred as soon as communities structures are created and access rights have been negotiated with neighboring communities.
241. **Capacity development needs:**
- Development of community-level capacities (governance, bookkeeping, monitoring & adaptive management...)
 - Identify institutions that will provide follow-on support to the Trusts and build their capacity to do so. Role of NGOs??
 - Develop strategy for building capacity to replicate/adapt the models to other communities in communal areas
242. **Potential sources of follow-on funding:**
- Government of Mali
 - GEF Small Grants (Is there a GEF Small Grants Program in Mali?)
243. **Other Recommendations: Mali**
- IVP headquarters needs to establish electronic communications with its field sites. This could involve reactivating the satellite-based communication system, if possible (this allows e-mail communications). At a minimum, the field managers should be equipped with cell phone communications.
 - Improved financial procedures. UNDP and the national director need to ensure that funds are available in the field when needed. The main role of the national office must be to support the field.
 - Organize exchange visits within Mali of sites already identified as being of direct interest to IVP.
 - Validation of consultant reports

Country Specific Recommendations: Kenya

244. **Empowerment of communities**
- IVP-Kenya and Government of Kenya should give priority to the identification of the most appropriate legal status for community structures (whether EMC status or some other is best)
 - GoK should identify the legal instruments for the empowerment of the community management structures (The EMC law, the new Forestry Law, the legislation that will follow the New Lands Policy or some other)
 - GoK should ensure that the community managers are formally empowered, using the legal instrument selected, before EOP.
245. **At the field sites:**
- From now to the end of project, field staff should focus primarily on the development of community-based range management systems.
 - New alternative livelihoods should only be started only in CBNRM pilot communities and should only be based on products from sustainable range management
 - Rapidly phase out support to tree nurseries
 - End all work in irrigated agricultural schemes
 - IVP should seek to develop rangeland management systems that cover all of the lands used by the pilot communities during the course of the year – both the rainy and dry seasons. At Turkana, include the ekwar, the dry plains and the hills
 - IVP should review the composition of the community management structures to ensure that they are representative of all the full community using all of the dry and wet season grazing lands during the course of the year.
 - Ensure the validation/negotiation/definition of access rights between the pilot communities and their neighbors;
 - Assist the management structures to be legally registered.
246. **Potential grazing system** The following system should be analyzed for its suitability (Discussions with villagers at Turkana indicate that this approximates their traditional system.)
- Rainy season grazing should be restricted primarily to the dry plains that are located over 15km from dry season water points. Portions of these dry plains in need of rehabilitation could be the object of deferred grazing;
 - During the dry season, the pastures within 15 km of water points could be divided into grazing units. These units would then be opened up sequentially to grazing (in rotation) during the dry season so that the last grazing unit is being opened up at the end of the dry season. Access to dry season pastures are thus spread out evenly over each dry season
 - Development of a plan for restoring all degraded sites using deferred grazing combined with other techniques.
247. **Tree management**
- IVP should assist community managers to test/develop techniques for individual tree management (on dry plains) and selective thinning of closed canopy stands (ekwar). Techniques for the selective cutting (harvest) of individual tree branches should be

developed. Individual branches can be harvested from most trees for use as thornbush fencing, dry season browse and/or firewood without harming the health of the tree.

248. **Potential sources of follow-on support:**
- Government of Kenya
 - UNDP/GEF Small Grants
 - UNDP Environment & Natural Resources Program?

Recommendations: Research

249. **Main Priorities**
- Nationally driven site-specific short-term research, leading to results that can be readily transferred to community
 - Good ecological long, medium and short term monitoring
 - Research Plan requires thorough revision
The responsibility for the quality of the plan rests with the University of Oslo. We believe this should be attended to as a matter of urgency, and that the plan should be supplied to the regional office within 1 month of the delivery of the finalized MTR. Requirements are listed in Appendix H.
250. **Other Priorities**
- Establish procedures and a clear protocol for effective communication and document management (Number and date all documents, specify response times, acknowledge emails)
 - Complete Oslo contract revision without further delay. This will complete the rationalization of the role of Oslo in line with the Regional Steering Committee decision, so that Oslo remains responsible for the Masters program, and its associated research activities, together with the monitoring components of the project, which will provide data for regional studies as well as meeting GEF requirements. However Oslo will act only in an advisory capacity for the site-specific research (Professor Stenseth was agreeable to this at the MTR/RPSC meeting).
 - Oslo team leaders should plan to ensure they complete their obligations in terms of time spent in Africa, reaching a reasonable balance between the three countries. This time should be used to oversee the research data collection, and to assist them to grasp the full picture of the issues in range management confronting communities on the ground (Professor Stenseth undertook to do this at the MTR meeting).
251. **Masters Research**
- We reaffirm the value of the University of Oslo's role as research leader for the Master's projects.
 - Students should be informed immediately on matters affecting them, including the UN policy on high-risk areas, and computer ownership.
 - There should be an internal review of the support provided for students at NorAgric, to enable them to improve their services to international students. This review should include feedback from the students.

- We are concerned that the students may not receive adequate supervision during their fieldwork. We therefore recommend that a national associate supervisor is identified for each student, and that the national committees all provide some logistical assistance to the students (we understand that some financial support is available from Oslo in addition to the stipend).
- Masters research outputs should be made available to communities and IVP field teams immediately upon their completion. Hence the results should be produced in a community friendly format. In addition the results should be made available to communities shortly after completion through the technical advisors/consultants to be hired.
- We recommend that the students should present their findings to a regional conference, which will involve stakeholders (government, scientific, administrative and site representatives). We suggest the conference should be held in Mali. Site-specific research findings could also be presented at this conference. National conferences could also be held in Kenya and Botswana, where the emphasis would be on identifying the lessons for the country concerned

252. **Data Collection – Transects**

- In view of the concerns about the research plan, we recommend that an independent check, by a consultant or representative of GEF experienced in reviewing their projects, be carried out on a sample of the transects to ensure they meet GEF requirements for the monitoring of ecological impacts.

253. **Site-Specific Research - General**

- We recommend that the proposals for this work are processed as a matter of urgency.
- We recommend the appointment of a national technical advisor for advice and technology transfer, using national budgets for funding.
- The site-specific research must be completed by November 2006. Outputs should be in community friendly format, and must include literature surveys, and a review of previous experience with CBRM
- The University of Oslo should maintain an advisory role for site-specific research, but the responsibility for leadership of this component should be delegated to the National Offices. Budgets should be handled directly between the National Project Leader and UNOPS.
- We recommend that the Regional Office should agree to advise Oslo of proposals and progress, and to invite comments from Oslo that can be forwarded to the researchers.

254. **Site-Specific Research - Botswana and Mali**

- Site specific research proposals have already been approved by the National Technical Committees in Botswana and Mali. Their conformity with recommendations and criteria presented in the MTR should be checked. Oslo should provide inputs and guidance without delay, if this has not already been done and should be available for backstopping during implementation of the research. Any identifiable knowledge gaps should be met by approaching available research providers. Any overlaps should be handled by negotiation and agreement to share

data. The NTCs should have the authority to approve and give the go-ahead for the projects.

255. **Site -Specific Research – Kenya**

- An invitation to research providers to provide a literature review and CBRM review, together with any other local needs, should be prepared and circulated as soon as possible. After reviewing proposals the NTC should have the authority to approve and give the go-ahead. As elsewhere, any knowledge gaps should be met by approaching research providers, while any overlaps should be handled by negotiation and agreement to share data.

256. **Budgetary Adjustments**

- Necessary budget adjustments should be made to free up resources for the site-specific research and for the technical support.

Other Recommendations

257. **Needs for technical expertise** Effective mechanisms for delivery of technical expertise need to be developed for the remaining two years. The main need is for expertise in range management. The field teams need assistance range management specialists who can analyze traditional knowledge, scientific research results and the practical results from projects, private or leasehold ranches, etc, and translate them into practical range management options for the consideration of the community managers. The second area where IVP field teams needs additional assistance is expertise in community-based natural resource management approaches. The needs for outside expertise are greatest in Mali and Kenya. It is believed that Botswana has a pool of in-country expertise to be found on the leasehold ranches & freehold farms and ranches.

258. It is recommended that the TOR/contract for the Regional Coordinator should be revised/renegotiated so that the RC will also play a key role as technical advisor to the IVP country teams. The RC should play a particularly strong role in support of Mali.

259. As budgetary resources permit, additional range management expertise should be sought in support of Mali and Kenya. One option would be to hire one of the best regional range management experts for each region on a retainer contract. The specialist could visit each of the project sites perhaps three times during the remaining time left in the project to advise on the development of range management systems. Well-qualified people are not always available on a retainer basis. Another option would be to hire a specialist for each country for a much more solid block of time – say eight months.

260. Ideally, the range management specialist(s) would also have expertise in CBNRM approaches. If not, short-term expertise should be sought in country or internationally.

261. The main technical advisory role for the development of range management systems should be played by the RC and by the short term consultants hired for this purpose. Oslo's main technical role should be for research. They should play a supportive technical role in advising on the development of management systems.

262. **Mainstreaming/ Sustainability** In each country, IVP should seek out and develop opportunities for mainstreaming of community-based management in government policies and programs and for the development of community/government/private sector/ NGP/ civil

society partnerships in support of CBRM. The young community management institutions will need follow-on support beyond IVP's EOP. IVP should identify the key government, civil society and private sector institutions that are best placed to provide such follow-on support to IVP pilot communities.

Mobilization of additional budgetary resources

263. **Sources of follow-on financial support.** IVP should also seek to identify sources of financial support beyond the EOP. IVP should make a special effort to ensure that government agencies include such support in their budget planning before IVP comes to an end. IVP, government and UNDP Country Offices should seek to identify other sources of follow-on support. UNDP GEF Small Grants program should be a good source of follow-on support as well as funding for replicating successful models. UNDP has environmental sector support programs in some countries (such as Botswana) that might be able to provide similar support. SLM projects, especially capacity-building projects, funded by any of the GEF implementing agencies are another source of future support.
264. **Capacity building** by IVP should focus on two types of institutions. The community management structures will need intensive support for capacity building in governance, bookkeeping/business management and in range/natural resource management. Secondly, those institutions identified for providing follow-on support and for replicating successful CBRM models will need capacity building for these tasks.

Appendices

Appendix A: Suggested Criteria for the Selection of Pilot Communities

Preference should be given to communities that:

1. Already have commonly agreed, mutually recognized borders of the lands to be managed or where there are no major conflicts preventing this from being quickly realized;
2. Have a high level of community-cohesiveness – lack of major schisms/conflicts – and a demonstrated capacity to take collective action to achieve agreed objectives;
3. Have a good level of community motivation for community-based range management;
4. Have a good potential for range/vegetation-based, profitable businesses that can cover management costs while generating benefits for individuals and the community as a whole;
5. Enjoy a good level of support from local authorities (government and/or traditional) for CBRM;
6. Are representative of the major ecological, social and economic conditions of the area;
7. Preferably, already have ecological monitoring transects established.

Appendix B: Suggested Criteria for Site-Based Targeted Research

Definition: By site-based targeted research, we mean research that is done to provide the information needed by communities and site managers to develop the pilot, community-based range management systems.

Recommendation: By mid-November, the research proposals should have been considered and approved.

We suggest a range of 4 to 8 projects for each country.

Criteria for site-based research to be funded:

1. The research provider must confirm commitment to complete research at least eight months before the end of the project (so that it can be used and integrated into the range management systems).
2. It must be relevant to the project objective. (The objective of the project is to conserve biodiversity and restore degraded rangelands through the establishment of community-based range management systems with pilot communities.)
3. The research must be relevant to the pilot communities
4. Clearly defined outcomes
5. It must be implementable.
6. Cost effectiveness. Total research for each country will be \$US90000.
7. Level of community involvement
8. Quality and originality of research.
9. Output format must be community friendly. Research results must be understandable and meaningful to pastoralists.
10. Track record and credentials of the research provider.
11. Research provider must be prepared to travel back to the community

Appendix C: Research Issues listed in Project Document

Reference (page and line)	Statement	Implied Nature of Research			Comment
		B a s i c	Ap plie d	Lit Re v	
P7: Point 9	Identify synthesize and apply state of art methods.	X	X	X	
7:9 + 11:33	Develop a model of desertification	X			
7:10	Develop innovative and integrated management systems incorporating Indigenous Knowledge (IK)	X	X		
7:10	Develop sustainable range management systems		X		
7.11 + 11:32	Application of research findings		X	X	
7.12	Comparative Research		X		

7:13	Testing of a full range of Research Management systems		X	X	
11.36 ...	Principle task of research will be to train		X		
11.36	Design monitoring systems		X		
11.36	Conduct analysis and synthesis of existing data		X	X	
11.36	Collect new data	X			
11.36	Communicate research findings			X	
Comp 1 p13:44	Identify indigenous methods		X		
Comp 2p13:45	Analysis of GIS data		X		
Comp 2p13:45	Comparison of participating planning methods and data collection		X	X	
Comp 2 p15	Establish database			X	
Comp 3 14:46	Different tree planting methods		X	X	
Comp 3 14:46	Comparison of plots enclosed vs traditional		X		
Comp 4 p14:48	Tests on irrigated fodder		X		
Comp 4 p14:48	Grass species selected and tested		X	X	
Comp 5 14:49	Testing management systems		X		
Comp 5 14:50	Energy saving devices		X		
Comp 6 15:53	Range rehabilitation		X		
Comp 6 15:53	Water harvesting		X		
Comp 6 15:53	Soil stabilisation		X		
Comp 6 15:53	Livestock Marketing		X		
Comp 6 15:53	Database development	X			
34:14	Fill in knowledge gaps		X	X	
34:15	Scope of analysis to include identification of strengths and weaknesses of local traditions and institutions		X		
	Evidence Needed to demonstrate:				
18:75	Guidelines for contracting NGO's				
18:77	Working relations between partners				
p20	Published articles and dissemination of info (Technical functions)				
P22	TAC has done tasks on p22, especially a,d,e, and f				
P24	CSU has assisted with research prioritisation				
P25	Has University of Oslo developed models				
28:82	Adequate environmental monitoring systems in place				

Appendix D: Research Plan Revision requirements

- It should be in line with the strategic recommendations of the MTR
- It should include plans for ecological monitoring that meet the following needs:
 - Meet GEF requirements for monitoring of ecological impacts of the pilot community-based range/vegetation management systems to be developed.
 - Yield useful information for the development of the CBRM systems
 - Yield useful information for adaptive management of rangelands by the community managers.
 - Provide data for model development
- The ecological monitoring plan should include the following items:
 - Purpose and objectives;
 - Full explanation on how the results will be used (in reference to the above needs)
 - Specification of criteria and methodologies for the location of transects including design for new transects where changes to existing management systems are introduced.
 - Full details for the collection of ecological monitoring data
 - Give full protocol details for collection of data. The protocol should include guidelines on a consistent method for recording the data and for creating a database that is compatible between the 3 countries, so that comparisons can be made.
 - Protocols for data analysis and storage including the definition of institutional responsibilities for these functions
- Complete timeline
- Lay out a plan for the mainstreaming of ecological monitoring beyond the end of project.
- Define responsibilities for ongoing monitoring and oversight of data collection, Data analysis, Data preservation and collation, and
- Define procedures for researchers to access data
- Specify Intellectual Property ownership (we recommend the data sets be public domain material, and readily accessible to researchers)
- Develop and clarify the definition of model(s) for the management of indigenous vegetation, including specification of input and outputs.
- Define the methodologies for model development;
- Define the information/database requirements for the model.
- Distinguish between what can be done by the end of project of the IVP and what would require a longer period of time.
- Layout a realistic plan for how resources will be mobilized for completing work on model development beyond EOP.
- Provide a definition of comparative regional research and a plan for doing this by the end of project
- List the site-specific research projects, indicating any relationships between them and the other research components.

Appendix E: Co-financing and Leveraged Resources

Planned Co-financing Information on co-financing in the Full Project Brief is somewhat confused. Three sources of co-financing are listed (in millions of US \$):

1. University of Oslo	1.6802
2. Others	.5003
3. Government contributions	2.1500

Footnotes provide this additional detail:

- NORAD is contributing with US\$ 1.15 million in cash

- GTZ is contributing with US\$250,000 in cash for the Kenya component of the project.

University of OSLO and NORAD can be considered to be synonymous – the funding actually comes from NORAD. The amounts listed for Oslo and NORAD obviously don't match and the reason is unknown.

The GTZ co-financing is for the GTZ project that the project works with at the Marsabit site in northern Kenya. There is no indication as to whether the GTZ funding is supposed to be included in the "Others" category. The GTZ funding is not mentioned in the ICA section of the report. These funds do not go through UNEP or UNDP or UNOPS but project has been implemented as planned and one can consider this commitment to have been honored.

The "Others" category is undefined. It would appear that there were no other co-financing commitments at the time that the Brief was approved. Furthermore, no new commitments have been obtained since then.

Current Commitments on co-financing

NORAD/Oslo The NORAD commitment was increased to US\$1.4100 million from the 1.15 indicated in the footnote – but this is still less than the 1.6802 listed for the University of Oslo on the cover page of the Full Project Brief.

The GTZ commitment has not changed. The funds do not go through UNEP or UNDP or UNOPS but the GTZ project has been implemented as planned and one can consider this commitment to remain unchanged.

Disbursements

Only one co-financing disbursement has been made and this was done by NORAD. Four equal annual disbursements were foreseen based on the original commitment of US\$1.15 million. The agreement with NORAD was signed very late. The annual payments have not been increased to compensate for the late signing – or to correspond to the increased total commitment of US\$1.41 million. NORAD has made one disbursement in the amount of \$288,000. According to the funding agreement with NORAD, payments are to be made in advance based on approved annual workplans and delays in work plan approval are said to be the reason for delays in the second payment. In the meantime, UNOPS has made total payments to the University of Oslo in the amount of \$465,471.

Planned and Actual Co-financing and Disbursement Made

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing (mill US\$)		Government (mill US\$)		Other* (mill US\$)		Total (mill US\$)		Total Disbursement (mill US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
- Grants	0	0	0	0	2.1805	1.410			.8625*	.288
- Loans/ Concessional (compared to market rate)										
- Credits										
- Equity investments										
- In-kind support			2.150	2.150			NA	NA		
- Others										

* GTZ funding is not included here. The US\$.8625 is the total for the three planned disbursements for 2003, 2004 and 2005 as listed on the cover page of the UNEP Prodoc for IVP.